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1. Introduction 
Standard employment is defined in terms of an open ended employment contract, 
restricted to one employer, and regulated by restrictions on working time, length of the working 
week and other defined conditions of work (Schmid, 2010). On the other hand, conditions of 
employment defined by temporary employment (casual work or fixed term contracts), temporary-
agency work, ambiguous employment relationships such as dependent homework, and part-time 
work are treated as non-standard forms of employment (NSFE) (ILO 2015).  
In the context of EU and OECD countries, formal employment contracts between the 
employer and employee for full time work can still be taken to be the norm, despite the growth of 
NSFE. In India and other developing countries, where self-employment, both in agriculture and 
outside it, is still the dominant form of employment, and where such employment is often 
characterized by indefinite hours of work and multiple modes of livelihood, the growth of NSFE 
and changes in employment characteristics have to be focused upon in paid work, within the 
context of the overall employment structural changes.  
Paid work is, broadly, regular / salaried work or casual work. Both are defined later in 
this paper. Casual work, in its entirety, needs to characterize as a NSFE because of the absence of 
a regular relationship between the worker and the employer. The contours of NSFE are also 
associated with informal employment, now extensively defined by the ILO as employment 
without any social security. Informal employment can coexist with self-employment and casual 
work, but increasingly with regular work. Further, temporary agency workers, described in India 
as “contract labour”, i.e. workers hired through contractors, also fall within the scope of NSFE. 
These three forms of employment overlap to varying degrees, but with changes emerging in the 
size of each category as well as the overlap. Putting-out workers or homeworkers are generally 
categorized as self-employed but are treated here as a non-standard form of employment because 
they also share several characteristics with such paid workers. Many other emerging non-
standards forms of employment, such as part-time work, are also important, but as we shall see 
from the case of part-time work, we have meagre macro evidence regarding them. This study, 
therefore, mainly focuses on analysis of casual work, informal employment, homework, and 
contract labour, which are considered to be the main forms in which NSFE exists, or is becoming 
more predominant in India. 
Table 1 provides the categorization of employment by major activity status and 
sectors/industries and shows the relationships and principal overlaps between the categories of 
employment discussed in this paper. As pointed out above, non-standard forms of employment 
(NSFE) are explored mainly in the context of paid work in the non-agricultural economy, but 
with some agricultural non-farm activity, defined by NIC codes 014, 016 and 017, for which we 
have similar data, also added in (Aiii to Bvii). Further, homeworkers (Aii, Bii) who share partial 
characteristics with paid workers in NSFE are also considered as part of NSFE universe. Total 
NSFE is, therefore, given by the light shaded area Aii to Bvi. The table also depicts the 
relationship between formal/informal employment and NSFE, as well as contract labour 
(temporary agency employment) and NSFE. While informal employment in India covers both 
paid as well as self-employed workers, in agriculture as well as outside it, here we focus only on 
informal employment among paid workers in non-agriculture (Aiii to Bvi) as NSFE. Contract 
labourers are a sub-set of informal workers in the formal non-agricultural sector (Aiv to Bv). 
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Table 1. Employment category of workers and non-standard forms of employment in India 
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In recent decades, a lot of debate in India has focused on the casualization of the Indian 
workforce, greater informalization of employment, and the use of contract labour. With regard to 
informalization and contract labour, the debate has focused on the causes of greater 
informalization and use of contract labour, and in particular, whether these changes are due to the 
need of employers to have more flexible and cheaper labour due to the needs of global 
production, or whether they are due to rigid labour laws in India. The debate has also taken up the 
implications of these for employment growth and conditions of labour, as well as for greater 
growth and productivity of the industrial and services sector. 
This paper is in nine sections. After the introductory section, the second section analyses 
the changes in employment structure in India by activity status, across sectors and major industry 
categories, with particular reference to the growth of casual labour (which is a major NSFE) and 
regular/salaried employment. Section 3 relates to the changes in the nature of informal 
employment in India, with focus on how informalization is increasingly turning regular 
wage/salaried employment into a NSFE. Section 4 analyses the trends in homework (putting-out 
work) which has grown due to globalization and outsourcing. Section 5 looks at the available but 
limited data on part-time work. Section 6 focuses on contract labour, which is an important form 
of employment relation in which NSFE is manifested in the organized sector. The analysis 
focuses on the organized manufacturing sector. The section also draws upon two recent micro 
studies on contract labour and labour standards in two of the most employment intensive 
industries outside of agriculture (construction and garment production) to throw further light on 
the use of contract labour and its implications. Section 7 of the paper analyses the empirical 
evidence on the relationship between non-standard forms of employment and conditions of work, 
skill-training of workers, and participation in workers’ organizations. Section 8 reviews and 
assesses recent changes in policy and labour law with implications for NSFE. Section 9 is the 
concluding section.  
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2. India’s changing employment structure and impact 
on casual and regular work 
India’s employment relations have to be understood in the context of the evolution of its 
economy from a predominantly agrarian and rural to one where the urban and non-agrarian 
sectors are gradually beginning to play a major role. The cross-over point occurred as recently as 
2011-12, when for the first time, the agrarian workforce dipped below half (Table 2). This shift in 
employment has occurred mainly in favour of the construction sector and services, whereas the 
share of employment in manufacturing has increased by only about two per cent points in nearly 
three decades. Over this period, the total share of manufacturing and services increased from 27.9 
per cent to 40.7 per cent, but with a large chunk of this increase coming from services. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of industry divisions in total employment, various years 
Industry groups 1983 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
Agriculture 69.0 64.0 60.0 56.6 51.5 47.8 
Mining, man. & elec. 11.6 12.5 11.8 13.0 12.3 13.8 
Construction 2.3 3.3 4.5 5.7 9.6 10.6 
Trade & hotels 7.2 8.6 10.4 10.8 11.3 11.9 
Real estate & finance 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.8 
Administration 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.2 1.8 
Education & health 2.1 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.5 4.0 
Community & household 2.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, Various Rounds on Employment-Unemployment 
This structural change has important implications in as much as the agrarian structure 
predominantly consists of self-employed and casual workers whereas regular employment is 
expected to have a much larger presence in the industrial and services sector, although not in the 
construction sector.1 
                                                   
1 The National Sample Survey (see Instruction to Field staff, NSS 68th Round, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, pp. A14-15) 
categorises workers as self-employed, regular wage/ salaried employee and casual wage labourer.  These categories 
are defined as follows: 
Self-employed: Persons who operate their own farm or non-farm enterprises or are engaged independently in a 
profession or trade on own-account or with one or a few partners are deemed to be self-employed in household 
enterprises. The self-employed are further categorised into own-account workers, employers, and helpers in 
household enterprises. The category of self-employed also includes ‘home workers’, ‘home based workers’ and ‘out 
workers’ who have some degree of autonomy and economic independence in carrying out the work, and their work 
is not directly supervised, as is the case for the employees.  
Regular wage/ salaried employee: These are persons working in other’s farm or non-farm enterprises (both 
household and non-household) and getting in return salary or wages on a regular basis (and not on the basis of daily 
or periodic renewal of work contract) are the regular wage/ salaried employees. This category not only includes 
persons getting time wage but also persons receiving piece wage or salary and paid apprentices, both full time and 
part-time. 
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Table 3. Percentage change in activity status of workers, various years 
Location  Status 1983 1993/94 1999/00 2004/05 2009/10 2011/12 
Rural 
Self-employed 61.2 58.3 55.5 60.4 54.5 56.4 
Regular 7.0 6.4 6.9 7.0 7.1 8.5 
Casual 31.8 35.3 37.5 32.5 38.4 35.1 
Urban 
Self-employed 42.8 42.3 42.0 45.2 41.1 42.0 
Regular 39.4 39.6 40.0 39.8 41.3 43.0 
Casual 17.8 18.1 18.0 15.0 17.6 15.0 
Rural + Urban 
Self-employed 57.7 54.7 52.2 56.6 50.8 52.3 
Regular 13.2 13.7 14.9 15.3 16.5 18.5 
Casual 29.1 31.6 32.8 28.1 32.7 29.3 
Source: Same as Table 2  
Note: Self-employed stands for Self employed 
The overall changes in the workforce by activity status, is shown in Table 3. While the 
percentage of self-employed workers has shown an irregular decrease, the percentage of regular 
workers increased systematically from 13.2 per cent in 1983 to 18.5 per cent in 2011-12. But 
there has been no systematic change in the percentage of casual workers. On the face of it, regular 
work is not treated as NSFE, but we go deeper into this when we consider formal/informal 
employment. However, notably, even in 2011-12, less than one in five workers were regular / 
salaried workers, while more than half the workers were self-employed and three in ten workers 
were casually employed.  
As one might expect, there are differences between rural and urban areas, with the former 
still dominated by agriculture, which has a high percentage of self-employed and casual workers. 
But in urban areas 43 per cent of workers were regular workers in 2011-12, up from 39.4 per cent 
in 1983. 
One may ask whether the change in employment structure in favour of more regular work 
is a result of changes that have taken place within industries, influenced, for example, by the 
growth of the formal segment, or whether it is mainly due to change in the share in total 
employment of different industries, which have varying propensities to employ self-employed, 
casual or regular workers, in total employment. 
Table 4 shows the activity wise composition of the workforce across different industry 
groups for three years (1983, 1999-00 & 2011-12). What is interesting is that while 
manufacturing shows a larger increase in the percentage share of regular wage/salaried workers 
between 1983 and 2011-12, the employment structure in the services sector shows a much smaller 
change between these years. However, the services sector has a high percentage of regular 
workers, both in the initial and terminal years. On the other hand the share of regular workers in 
agriculture and construction has declined. The implication of this is that with a share of the 
employment structure towards services, the share of regular wage/salaried workers in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Casual wage labour: A person casually engaged in other’s farm or non-farm enterprises (both household and non-
household) and getting in return wage according to the terms of the daily or periodic work contract is a casual wage 
labour. This includes one category of casual labourers in rural areas who normally engage themselves in 'public 
works' activities. 
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workforce will tend to increase. On the other hand, the growth of employment in the construction 
industry with a high share of casual work has more or less compensated for the declining casual 
workforce due the declining share of agriculture in total employment.  
In Table 5, we have shown the industry-wise share of regular workers in 1983, 1999-00 
and 2011-12. Between 1983 and 2011-12, the share of all regular workers in the services 
increased from 55.9 per cent to 67.7 per cent, while manufacturing’s share rose only from 22.8 
per cent to 24.6 per cent. Agriculture’s share in total regular workers declined from 15.6 per cent 
to only 2.2 per cent over this period.  
Gender differences in the share of regular workers across industries have increased over 
the years. In 1983, 23.2 per cent of all regular male workers and 19.5 per cent of all female 
regular workers were employed in manufacturing. By 2011-12, while the percentage of all male 
regular workers in manufacturing increased to 27.4 that of female workers fell to 13.4. On the 
other hand, while the share of regular male workers in services increased from 55.7 in 1983 to 
64.3 in 2011-12, that of female workers increased from 58 per cent to 81.6 per cent over the 
corresponding period. Most female regular workers were in educational services (32 per cent), 
followed by household services (13.4 per cent), manufacturing (13.1 per cent) and education 




Table 4. Percentage change in activity status of workers across industry divisions, various years 
  1983 1999-00 2011-12 
Industry/Sector Self-employed Regular Casual Self-employed Regular Casual Self-employed Regular Casual 
Agriculture 63.2 3.0 33.8 57.7 1.5 40.9 65.7 0.8 33.5 
Manufacturing 49.9 28.2 21.9 49.9 32.1 18.0 48.5 35.2 16.3 
Construction 19.1 10.2 70.7 18.0 5.5 76.6 10.8 4.7 84.5 
All services 48.1 43.0 8.9 47.7 41.5 10.8 48.3 44.9 6.8 
All non-agriculture 45.5 35.9 18.6 44.1 35.1 20.8 40.0 34.6 25.5 
All sectors 57.7 13.2 29.1 52.2 14.9 32.8 52.3 18.5 29.3 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, various rounds on employment-unemployment 
 
 
Table 5. Percentage of regular workers across industry divisions & sectors, various years 
  
Industry/Sector 
1983 1999-00 2011-12 
Male Female Persons Male Female Persons Male Female Persons 
Agriculture 15.1 19.3 15.6 5.6 7.4 5.9 2.0 3.1 2.2 
Mining 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.4 0.4 1.2 1.3 0.3 1.1 
Manufacturing 23.2 19.5 22.8 24.8 17.0 23.5 27.4 13.4 24.6 
Electricity 2.0 0.5 1.8 2.1 0.5 1.8 1.9 0.7 1.7 
Construction 1.9 0.7 1.8 1.9 0.5 1.6 3.2 0.8 2.7 
Trade 6.8 1.0 6.1 11.8 3.3 10.4 11.8 4.1 10.3 
Hotel 1.8 0.5 1.7 2.2 0.7 2.0 3.0 1.4 2.7 
Transport 10.3 2.1 9.3 12.2 3.2 10.7 12.9 1.7 10.7 
Finance 2.7 1.6 2.6 3.3 2.6 3.2 3.9 3.2 3.8 
Real estate 0.8 0.4 0.8 2.0 1.4 1.9 6.1 4.9 5.8 
Administration 19.7 12.4 18.9 18.4 11.5 17.3 10.3 5.9 9.5 
Education 8.6 25.9 10.6 9.2 28.7 12.3 10.4 32.0 14.6 
Health 2.3 7.8 3.0 2.2 9.3 3.4 2.4 9.3 3.8 
Community services 2.7 6.4 3.1 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 6.1 2.8 
Household 
   
1.3 11.9 3.0 1.4 13.1 3.7 
Total services 55.7 58.0 55.9 64.3 74.3 66.0 64.3 81.6 67.7 
All non-agriculture 84.9 80.7 84.4 94.4 92.6 94.1 98.0 96.9 97.8 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, various rounds on employment-unemployment
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The preceding analysis shows that the 21 per cent point decline in the percentage of 
workforce engaged in agriculture over roughly three decades has been accompanied by relatively 
little overall change in the distribution of activity status of the workers. Self-employment is still 
the dominant activity status, followed by casual work and regular/salaried work. While more than 
half the workers were still self-employed, less than one-fifth workers were engaged as regular 
/salaried workers in 2011-12. Between the initial and terminal years, however, the percentage of 
those self-employed fell by just over five and those engaged as regular workers rose by a similar 
percentage. This relatively small increase in the regularly employed occurred principally because 
of the shift in the workforce from agriculture to other sectors, mainly due to shift to services 
which engage a higher percentage of regular workers. The construction sector also absorbed a 
higher percentage of the workforce, but these workers were mainly casually employed. The 
activity structure remained virtually unchanged within the broad industrial groupings 
(manufacturing, services etc.). The workforce structure did not experience increased 
casualization, as has often been debated, but nor was there a very substantial increase, as a whole, 
in the proportions of the regularly employed. However, the industrial composition of regular 
workers experienced a significant change, different across sexes, with nearly two-third of male 
regular workers and more than four-fifth of female regular workers being in services, but with a 
major concentration of the latter in the social sectors, household paid services, and manufacturing. 
Further, important changes have occurred that are related to the growth of formal and informal 
employment, across the organised and unorganised sectors, which we discuss in Section 3 below.   
3. Formal and informal employment 
Formal and informal employment can exist both within the formal and informal sectors of 
the economy, but these sectors have different attributes with respect to regulations. In this paper, 
we have regarded informal employment among paid workers as a NSFE, and in this section, we 
further focus on informal employment in the formal sector of the economy. 
The ILO (15th ICLS) and the ILO Delhi Group have defined the basic attributes of the 
formal sector, leaving it to countries to evolve specific definitions of the formal sector in country 
specific contexts (ILO 2013). In the past, the Indian statistical system and the regulatory 
framework has used the term "organised sector" to categorise those establishments which come 
under the regulatory framework and has used criteria of numbers employed in an establishment, 
along with (in the case of manufacturing), registration under the Factories Act, 1948. There are 
numerous other forms of registration available, such as registration under the Companies Act or 
the Shops and Establishment Act, which do not specify the ownership/management criteria and/or 
the minimum numbers employed and these have not been taken as criteria to categorise 
organised/unorganised sectors (NCEUS 2008, NSC 2011). 
The National Commission for the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) in its various reports 
(NCEUS 2007, 2008), has drawn a distinction between organised/formal sector and the 
unorganised/informal sector using the basic criteria of enterprise type and employment size. It has 
categorised individual proprietorship/partnership based enterprises employing less than ten 
workers only as belonging to the informal sector. However, it has also included all agricultural 
operations on private holdings as being part of the informal sector. The basic difference is that 
while the NCEUS treats all private and public limited companies, irrespective of size, and all 
other establishments with ten or more workers, as belonging to the formal sector, social security 
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laws and employment protection legislation usually take either the Factories Act (in the case of 
manufacturing firms) or size (twenty or more workers) as the demarcating point.2  
The notion of formal and informal employment was first given shape by the 17th ICLS of 
the ILO in 1997. Informal workers include workers in paid jobs without job security or social 
security. The concept has been elaborated and countries have defined informal employment using 
one or both of these yardsticks (job security and/or social security) (Hussmans 2004, ILO 2013).  
Data on employment in the organised sector is required to be reported to the Director 
General of Employment and Training (DGET) and is collated and published by it. But since 
1999-00, the NSS also collects data on employment by size and type of enterprise and these 
results show that organised sector employment is underreported by the DGET. Further, the direct 
estimates of employment in the formal/organised sector obtained from the NSS also show that the 
formal sector has grown in India’s high growth period (Srivastava and Naik, 2015). Formal sector 
employment grew at a higher rate between 2004-05 and 2011-12 in all major sectors except 
mining (ibid.).3 This trend is also corroborated by figures for organised sector manufacturing 
estimated from the Annual Survey of Industries examined later in this paper. Thus apart from the 
growth of regular employment, discussed earlier, the growth of employment in the formal sector, 
also raises a question regarding the possibility of growth in formal employment in India, and this 
is the issue to which we turn next.  
In India, no direct data on informal employment was available till the NSS 55th Round 
(1999-00), and a reasonable approximation to such employment among paid workers was casual 
workers. The NSS 55th Round collected information on limited aspects of social security available 
to paid workers in the non-farm sector (relating to availability of provident fund). Subsequent 
rounds of the NSS in 2004-05, 2009-10 and 2011-12, have extended enquiry to availability of 
other types of social security benefits, as well as the nature of job contract between the employee 
and the employer. While NCEUS (2007, 2008) used the non-availability of social security as the 
main criterion of informality, the non-existence of any job security is, according to us, a more 
fundamental criterion of informality in India. This is also because Indian social security laws have 
created social security entitlements, at least on paper, for all types of workers in formal sector 
establishments, even if such workers do not have minimal job security. Further, from the data 
available, we consider the most rudimentary criteria of no job security as workers without any 
written contract since these workers have no proof of their contractual status and are in a weak 
position to exercise any claims. In the subsequent discussion in this section we have considered 
those workers (regular/casual) not having any written job contract as being informally employed. 
3.1 Informal workers without any written job contract 
As discussed earlier, the NSS surveys of 2004-05 and subsequent employment-unemployment 
surveys have collected information from paid workers (employees) on the type and size of 
                                                   
2 The definition of organised and unorganised sectors used by the NCEUS, as well as the official system, and issues 
relating to estimation of the informal/unorganised sector as well as employment are discussed in NCEUS (2008) and 
also in NSC (2012). 
3 Between 2004-05 and 2011-12, in manufacturing, formal sector employment grew at the annual rate of 5.4 per cent 
while informal sector employment and total employment grew by 0.3 per cent and 1.9 per cent respectively. In 
services, formal sector employment grew at the rate of 5.9 per cent over this period while informal sector 
employment and total employment grew at rates of 2 per cent and 3.1 per cent respectively.  
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enterprise in which they were currently employed, whether they had a written contract, and if so, 
of what duration, whether they could avail of any paid leave etc. The NSSO rounds provide this 
information for all paid workers (employees) in non-agriculture (NIC codes 2 to 99). It also 
covers NIC codes 014, 016 and 017 in agriculture. In the relevant NIC groups covered, the paid 
workers covered constitute 43.4 per cent of all workers. 
Results show that while the number of employees grew in both categories (workers with a 
written contract and workers without any contract), the hired workforce consisting of workers 
without contracts experienced a much faster increase during 2004-05 and 2011-12. As can be 
expected, negligible numbers of casual workers report having a contract with employers. The 
high growth rate of workers without any written contract occurred not only among all employees 
(casual workers plus regular workers) but also for regular workers alone. For example in 
manufacturing while the formal regular workforce grew at the rate of only 0.7 per cent during 
2004-05 and 2011-12, the informal regular workers grew at the rate 4.1 per cent per year. In the 
tertiary sector, the gap was lower. While informal regular employees increased at 4.5 per cent per 
year, formal regular employees increased at 2.1 per cent per year. The overall growth rates of 
formal and informal employees in the tertiary sector were 3.6 per cent and 1.5 per cent 
respectively. In the entire non-agricultural sector, the informal regular workers increased at 4.6 
per cent per year while formal regular employees increased at 1.9 per cent per year. Among all 
employees outside agriculture, formal employment grew by only 1.3 per cent per year while 
informal employment grew by 5.8 per cent per year (Table 6).  
 Table 6. Numbers of workers (in million), with and without contract and growth rate, 
2004-05 and 2011-12 
Industry/ Sector 
Without contract With contract 
Regular Casual All employees Regular Casual All employees 
                                                       2004-05 
Manufacturing 12.7 9.2 21.9 4.4 0.2 33.5 
Secondary 13.8 29.2 43.0 5.6 0.3 39.7 
Tertiary 26.2 8.2 34.5 20.2 0.2 78.2 
Non-agriculture 40.0 37.5 77.5 25.8 0.5 117.8 
                                                       2011-12 
Manufacturing 16.8 9.8 26.5 4.7 0.1 34.3 
Secondary 19.2 51.1 70.3 6.0 1.1 42.1 
Tertiary 35.6 8.7 44.3 23.3 0.2 86.7 
Non-agriculture 54.8 59.8 114.6 29.3 1.3 128.8 
                                        Annual growth rate (%) 
Manufacturing 4.1 0.8 2.8 0.7 -1.2 0.3 
Secondary 4.9 8.3 7.3 1.0 18.7 0.8 
Tertiary 4.5 0.8 3.6 2.1 2.2 1.5 
Non-agriculture 4.6 6.9 5.8 1.9 14.4 1.3 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, Various Rounds on Employment-Unemployment 
Note: "All employees" includes both casual and regular workers and thus refers to total waged/salaried workers. 
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The result of these changes is a shift in the structure of paid employment from formal to 
informal across almost all NIC divisions. This is shown in Table 7. In 2004-05, 74.5 per cent of 
all non-agricultural wage and salaried workers and even 60.3 per cent of regular workers among 
them reported having no contract. These percentages increased to 78.7 and 64.7 within a short 
span of seven years. The percentage of workers not reporting having any contract increased both 
in manufacturing and the service sector. Finance and Real estate were the only two groups which 
reported some increase in the percentage of workers with contracts. 
Typically, the organised (formal) sector of the economy is expected to generate more 
formal jobs and therefore we examine whether this has been the case between 2004-05 and 2011-
12. Table 8 shows the percentage of informal jobs in the formal sector in 2004-05 and 2011-12. 
For purpose of comparison, we have used the definition of the formal sector proposed the 
NCEUS, discussed at the beginning of this section, as well as the criteria for the formal/organised 
sector currently in practice in official data. The latter is more consistent with the ambit of the 
current labour and social security legislation.4  




All employees Regular workers All employees Regular workers 
Agriculture* 99.8 94.9 99.7 91.9 
Mining 68.8 24.5 70.6 26.7 
Manufacturing 82.6 74.0 84.7 78.3 
Electricity 28.3 25.3 39.5 35.9 
Construction 97.9 74.6 96.8 81.1 
Trade 91.9 89.7 91.7 89.7 
Hotels 89.1 84.3 90.7 87.9 
Transport 74.5 65.5 76.9 70.5 
Finance 31.4 30.7 43.4 42.7 
Real estate 64.6 60.9 58.7 55.7 
Administration 27.5 26.5 30.8 30.6 
Education 37.5 37.1 43.5 43.0 
Health 47.2 45.5 49.9 48.3 
Community 83.5 77.1 85.0 79.1 
Household 97.6 97.3 97.8 97.9 
Primary 99.0 76.9 98.8 69.7 
Secondary 87.8 71.0 90.7 76.1 
Tertiary 62.9 56.5 65.3 60.4 
Non-agriculture 74.5 60.3 78.7 64.7 
Total 86.2 61.6 86.0 65.3 
Note: * Only NIC codes 014, 016 and 017 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, Various Rounds on Employment-Unemployment   
                                                   
4 In manufacturing, the definition of the organised sector is aligned to the coverage of the Factories Act which is 10 
or more workers working with the aid of power, and 20 or more workers working without the aid of power. Workers 
covered by the Factories Act also are entitled to social security benefits and other protection. In other sectors, 
organised sector establishments (other than public sector establishments) are those with 20 or more workers.  
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Table 8. Percentage of informal workers (without contract) in the formal sector 
NIC Division 
Formal sector –NCEUS 
Definition 
Formal sector - Alternative (Official) 
Definition 

















Agriculture 45.4 76.1 38.7 77.0 40.6 65.6 31.7 74.1 
Mining 22.6 54.2 24.9 56.3 19.4 47.3 20.0 52.4 
Manufacturing 64.1 73.1 72.5 78.0 62.7 70.9 72.7 77.3 
Electricity 22.0 24.7 33.5 36.4 21.0 22.8 30.2 33.1 
Construction 62.7 93.7 74.1 91.4 57.2 90.5 66.8 88.3 
Trade 67.1 73.3 71.0 74.3 54.3 65.8 61.8 66.1 
Hotels 65.8 69.9 76.6 78.2 47.9 54.1 71.0 72.5 
Transport 35.2 41.8 43.7 48.4 28.5 33.3 34.8 38.6 
Finance 25.5 26.2 37.0 37.7 22.7 23.1 32.3 33.3 
Real estate 41.8 43.7 46.5 48.0 35.4 37.0 41.0 42.4 
Administration 25.6 26.6 30.6 30.8 25.4 26.4 30.6 30.8 
Education 28.4 28.9 37.5 37.7 24.4 24.8 34.0 34.2 
Health 30.1 32.0 39.9 41.0 23.2 24.8 34.5 35.7 
Community 49.1 54.4 51.1 54.4 40.6 44.6 42.1 46.2 
Household 100.0 100.0 
  
83.3 94.6 79.6 81.7 
Primary 26.9 59.5 27.6 62.6 23.4 51.2 22.2 58.7 
Secondary 60.2 74.7 69.7 81.5 58.2 70.3 68.9 78.9 
Tertiary 31.7 34.3 41.2 42.9 26.6 28.7 35.6 37.0 
Non-agriculture 40.3 51.3 50.3 61.2 36.1 45.0 46.7 56.5 
Total 40.3 51.6 50.2 61.4 36.1 45.2 46.7 56.6 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, Various Rounds on Employment-Unemployment 
The formal sector shows a very high degree of informalization, much more than is 
commonly attributed to it. Already, by 2004-05, 51.6 per cent of the paid workforce in the non-
agricultural formal sector (NCEUS definition) was informal. Further the formal non-agricultural 
sector has seen a significant increase in the informalization of the workforce (to 61.4 per cent in 
2011-2012), and once again this informalization has significantly affected regular / salaried 
workers, among whom the percentage share of informal workers went up from 40.3 to 50.2.  
Informalization has also affected the regulated part of the formal sector (which is covered 
here by the alternative official definition) more deeply, with the percentage share of informal 
workers increasing from 45 per cent to 56.5 per cent of all employees, and from 36.1 to 46.7 for 
regular workers. It has also affected all industry groups to varying degrees. Only NIC groups 014, 
016 and 016, representing a small segment of non-farm activity within agriculture do not show 
increased informalization as per these results. 
In the case of manufacturing, the percentage of informal regular workers in the formal 
sector (alternative definition) increased from 62.7 to 72.7, and the total percentage of informal 
workers among all employees increased from 70.9 to 77.3.  The formal tertiary sector again 
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shows a lower level of informalization, but here too, the increased pace of informalization 
matches manufacturing.  
It must be reiterated that formal sector employment rose over this period (in the next 
section, we will examine data for manufacturing from the Annual Survey of Industries). But 
within the formal sector, informal employment has been rising at a much faster rate than formal 
employment. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of formal sector employment (as per the official 
definition) in manufacturing and in the secondary and tertiary sectors between 2004-05 and 2011-
12, as well as the growth rates of formal and informal employment within these sectors. 
Of course, the picture presented here pertains to all employees, including highly skilled 
and managerial employees who are more likely to be recorded here as formal workers on the basis 
of the rudimentary criteria used in this section - since they are highly unlikely to be employed 
with any written contract. 
Figure 1. Annual growth rate of formal and informal workers in the formal sector,      
2004-05 to 2011-12 
 
Source: Computed from unit level data, NSSO, various rounds on employment-unemployment 
To conclude: informal employment can readily be treated as a NSFE. The share of 
informal workers (defined here as workers without any written contract) among all employees, 
has grown in recent years. It has also grown very rapidly in the formal sector of the economy, and 
this has happened not only because of casualization, but because an increasing proportion or 
regular/salaried workers are in more precarious employment relations, employed without 
contracts which makes it much more difficult for them to benefit from any existing employment 
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4. Dependent workers (homeworkers) 
Workers who work in, or near, their homes, under various kinds of putting out systems 
and sub-contracting arrangements (to one or more contractors) are characterized in India as self-
employed, in terms of their activity status.  However, these workers differ from independent self-
employed workers, and for all practical purposes, constitute a category of disguised wage 
workers, although they use some part of their own capital. The ILO Homework Convention No. 
177 categorises these dependent workers as homeworkers (also called outworkers) and they also 
are considered as a category of non-standard form of employment.5  
The contractual arrangements, working hours and working conditions of these workers 
are not subject to any form of regulation. Homework is often embedded in value chains, both 
domestic and global, with the latter showing an enormous increase in presence in some industries. 
Data on dependent production and homeworkers can be extracted from specific rounds of 
the NSS on employment-unemployment viz. survey rounds for 1999-00 and 2009-10  (which are 
worker based), or from surveys of the unorganised / informal sector (which are enterprise based).  
The worker based surveys are more pertinent as they provide direct information on the estimates 
of such workers and their distribution across industries. They provide information on whether 
self-employed workers work in their own dwellings and whether they produce partly or wholly 
under specification. 
As NCEUS (2007, pp. 58-59) has pointed out, the independent self-employed and the 
dependent workers do not fall into two neat categories but there is a continuum from of 
dependence, from being fully independent to being fully dependent on the contractor/middlemen 
for prices, raw material, credit, design and markets. More extreme forms of dependence exist 
when there is ‘vertical sub-contracting (cf. Watanabe, 1983) in which the production is contracted 
by providing raw materials etc. such sub-contracting relationships are estimated to cover about 70 
per cent of homeworkers in 1999-00 (ibid.) 
Estimates of the numbers of homeworkers, based on range of dependent relationships, 
and independent self-employed in rural and urban areas, and by sex, in the non-agricultural 
sector, are given in Table 9. This shows that there has been an across the board increase in the 
number of homeworkers between 1999-00 and 2009-10. The number of male homeworkers 
increased from 3.4 million in 1999-00 to 5.4 million in 2009-10, and this reflected an increase in 
both rural and urban areas. The number of female homeworkers outnumbered the number of male 
homeworkers and stood at 4.2 million in 1999-00 and 5.5 million in 2009-10. Overall, the number 
of total homeworkers increased from 7 million in 1999-00 to 11 million in 2009-10.  
Since the total numbers of female self-employed workers outside agriculture is much 
lower than male workers, the share of female homeworkers among total self-employed is much 
higher among females at 32.7 per cent than among males (7.7 per cent). 
                                                   
5 The ILO Convention No. 177, adopted in 1996, defines a homeworker as a person who carries out work for 
remuneration in premises of his/her choice, other than the workplace of the employer, resulting in a product or 
service as specified by the employer, irrespective of who provided the equipment, material or inputs used. Thus 
strictly speaking, a homeworker need only be “working at a place of his/her own choice”, while in this analysis, we 
have considered only those dependent workers as homeworkers who work in their dwelling places.  
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Table 9. Estimated numbers of homeworkers and independent self-employed by sex, across rural 
and urban areas, 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 
Status of employment 
Sector & sex of worker 
Rural Urban Rural + Urban 
1999-2000 Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Self-employed: 
Independent 
23.1 6.2 29.3 26.6 4.9 31.5 49.6 11.1 60.8 
Homeworkers 1.9 2.5 4.4 1.5 1.7 3.1 3.4 4.2 7.6 
All self-employed 25.0 8.7 33.7 28.0 6.6 34.7 53.0 15.4 68.4 
2009-2010 
         
Self-employed: 
Independent 
31.8 6.1 37.9 34.0 5.2 39.2 65.7 11.3 77.1 
Homeworkers 2.8 2.9 5.7 2.6 2.6 5.3 5.4 5.5 11.0 
All self-employed 34.6 9.0 43.6 36.6 7.9 44.5 71.2 16.9 88.0 
Source: Estimated from unit data of the NSS 55th (2009-10) and 66th (2009-10) survey on employment and unemployment 
(Schedule 10). 
Note: Homeworkers are defined here as those working in own dwelling unit or structure attached to own dwelling unit and 
working partly, mainly or wholly under specification. 
Most homeworkers are concentrated in manufacturing. In 2011-12, 80.4 per cent of all 
homeworkers and 92 per cent of female homeworkers were in unorganized manufacturing. Table 
10 gives the estimated numbers of homeworkers and independent self-employed workers, as well 
as their percentages among total self-employed workers. The numbers of both male and female 
homeworkers in unorganized manufacturing registered a rise between 1999-00 and 2009-10. The 
number of male homeworkers in manufacturing rose from 2.5 million to 3.7 million while that of 
female homeworkers rose from 3.9 to 5.1 million over this period. The share of both male and 
female homeworkers among total self-employed workers in manufacturing also rose for both 
male and female workers. But in 2011-12, while one in four male self-employed workers in 
manufacturing were homeworkers, more than half of female self-employed workers were 
homeworkers. 
Table 10. Estimated numbers and percentage share of homeworkers and independent self-
employed by sex in unorganized manufacturing, 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 
  1999-2000 2009-2010 
  Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Self-employed workers (million) 
Self- employed: Independent 10.0 4.6 14.6 11.1 4.7 15.8 
Homeworkers 2.5 3.9 6.4 3.7 5.1 8.8 
All self-employed 12.5 8.4 21.0 14.8 9.7 24.6 
Percentage to total self-employed employed 
Self-employed: Independent 80.0 54.1 69.6 74.8 47.9 64.1 
Homeworkers 20.0 45.9 30.4 25.2 52.1 35.9 
All self-employed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source and Definitions used are same as in previous table 
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Table 11. Percentage share of homeworkers across industries, by sex, 1999-2000 and 2009-2010 
  1999-2000 2009-2010 
Industries Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Leather & leather related products 3.5 1.5 2.3 3.2 2.1 2.6 
Tobacco products 16.9 50.5 37.3 8.8 33.2 22.8 
Textiles 34.7 26.4 29.7 30.2 27.7 28.8 
Wearing apparel 8.1 4.6 6.0 21.4 23.6 22.7 
Coke and refined petroleum products 2.2 0.3 1.0 2.1 0.7 1.3 
Chemical and chemical products 11.8 3.5 6.7 8.6 2.2 4.9 
Basic metals 0.2 6.5 4.0 0.1 2.6 1.5 
Computer, electronics and optical products 2.8 0.5 1.4 3.5 2.1 2.7 
Machinery and equipment 4.8 1.4 2.8 4.0 0.6 2.0 
Wooden furniture 8.6 2.9 5.1 12.3 4.2 7.6 
Other industries 5.4 1.9 3.3 4.5 1.0 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source and Definitions used are same as in previous table. Industries are at two digit classification level. 
 
The gendered nature and the changes in homework are also bought out by the industry-
wise distribution of male and female homeworkers in 1999-00 and 2009-10, given in Table 11. In 
1999-00, more than a third of male homeworkers were in textiles, followed by Tobacco products 
(16.9 per cent), Chemical and chemical products (11.8 per cent), Wooden furniture (8.6 per cent) 
and Wearing Apparel (8.1 per cent). Among female homeworkers, more than half were in 
Tobacco Products, followed by Textiles (26.4 per cent), Basic Metals (6.5 per cent) and Wearing 
Apparel (4.6 per cent). In 2009-10, while the largest percentage of homeworkers was still 
concentrated in Textiles (30.2 per cent), this was followed by Wearing Apparel (21.4 per cent), 
Wooden Furniture (12.3 per cent), Tobacco Products (8.8 per cent) and Chemical and Chemical 
products (8.6 per cent). While for female homeworkers, Tobacco Products was the largest 
employer, the percentage of workers in this industry fell to 33.2. Textiles continued to be the 
second largest employer, and there was a very sharp jump in the percentage of female 
homeworkers employed in Wearing Apparel (from 4.6 per cent to 23.6 per cent).  Together, 
Textiles and Wearing Apparel accounted for 51.6 per cent of male homeworkers and 60.9 per 
cent of female homeworkers. In these industries, these homeworkers form the lowest rung of 
domestic and global value chains. 
In the case of homework, since homes are the production space, women and children in 
households may be able to divide time more flexibly between household responsibilities and 
chores, schooling, and production. This becomes all the more important if women are also 
confined to their homes because of cultural constraints on mobility and access to public spaces. 
From the employers’ perspective, homeworkers provide both flexible labour and reduced cost of 
capital, along with (in many cases) skills. But the workers, who are unprotected by any 
regulation, receive very inadequate compensation and are subject to occupational health hazards 
and several other problems. As a matter of fact, home based work is also used by employers and 
contractors to escape the ambit of labour regulation in areas such as child labour, minimum 
wages, etc. A review of the conditions of work of homeworkers by NCEUS (2007) points out that 
homework is more unlikely to involve a larger proportion of the vulnerable sections of the 
workforce, such as women and child workers. Studies show that homeworkers receive much 
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lower wages than workers based in industrial establishments (Labour Bureau, 1996; Unni and 
Rani, 2005; Mehrotra and Biggeri, 2007).  
As Srivastava (2012a) has pointed out, the India-wide macro trends are well corroborated 
by industry-specific and micro studies which provide evidence of increased ‘home-workisation’ 
among female workers, especially in export oriented global value chains such as those in apparel 
manufacturing (Mezzadri, 2007; Hirway, 2010). Mehrotra (2003) has also noted an accelerated 
pace of sub-contracting and feminized home-work in export oriented value chains based on a five 
country study in South Asia and describes this outsourcing trend as the ‘dirt road’, driven by the 
desire of firms to cut costs to bare minimum, and the desire of marginal workers to take up work 
at any cost. 
5. Part-time work 
Part-time work is usually defined as work performed for less than a certain hours per 
week (usually thirty-five hours) (ILO, 2015). Part-time work may exist because of insufficient 
demand/requirement for full-time work (which can be the case both under self-employment) 
and/or because employers prefer to offer part-time work and it may also, in some cases, match 
supply side preferences, particularly in the case of women who have to combine work with 
household social reproduction duties. In India, part-time work has been endemic in self-employed 
activities both in agriculture and outside agriculture, but there is also a growing trend for part-
time wage/salaried employment, with employers preferring to split up the working days and 
offering half-day work (as in agriculture) or activity based employment (as in employment by 
households). Some types of part-time employment are better studied, as for example, for women 
domestic helps, but there is no macro data on part-time work as defined above. 
However, the National Sample Survey canvases a block of questions on availability for 
work and nature of employment for persons working in the usual principal or subsidiary status.  
One of the questions pertains to whether the worker was engaged mostly in full time or part time 
work during last 365 days. This question provides some insight into the pattern of part-time work 
which we analyse below. 
Overall, the data does not reveal a systematic temporal trend in part-time work. This 
could be because of poor reporting of such work and also because of the structural changes 
discussed in earlier sections, in which agricultural self-employment is gradually declining. 
The rural-urban distribution shows that there are more part-time workers in rural areas. 
This can be expected because of the predominance of agriculture in rural areas (despite its 
decline) and is confirmed in Table 12. Part-time work is reportedly high among the self-employed 
in rural areas. But in recent years, a higher percentage of rural casual workers report part-time 
work.   
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Table 12. Percentage of workers in rural and urban areas reporting part time work 
  1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2011-12 
Rural 
    
Self-employed 6.1 11.4 13.8 10.1 
Regular 0.0 2.2 2.0 1.7 
Casual 4.2 7.9 6.9 6.6 
Total 4.5 9.4 10.7 8.1 
Urban 
Self-employed 5.5 10.0 10.1 7.6 
Regular 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 
Casual 4.9 8.0 6.5 5.7 
Total 4.0 6.3 6.1 4.7 
Rural + Urban 
Self-employed 6.0 11.1 13.0 9.5 
Regular 0.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 
Casual 4.3 7.9 6.9 6.5 
Total 4.5 8.6 9.6 7.1 
Source: Computed from unit level NSS employment-unemployment survey data for different years. 
 
Table 13. Percentage of male and female workers reporting part time work 
  1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2011-12 
Male 
    
Self-employed 5.1 5.3 4.8 3.9 
Regular 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.8 
Casual 3.3 6.1 4.9 4.1 
Total 3.6 4.8 4.1 3.3 
Female 
    
Self-employed 11.1 23.7 28.4 23.0 
Regular 0.0 5.8 5.2 4.6 
Casual 6.4 11.4 10.6 12.6 
Total 6.8 17.6 21.0 17.4 
Persons 
    
Self-employed 6.0 11.1 13.0 9.5 
Regular 0.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 
Casual 4.3 7.9 6.9 6.5 
Total 4.5 8.6 9.6 7.1 
Source: Computed from unit level NSS employment-unemployment survey data for different years. 
The data shows that there is a distinct gendered pattern in part-time employment. Part-
time work is much more common among women workers - more than five times as high 
(Table 13). Overall one in five or six women workers report themselves as pert-time workers. 
This is not only the case for self-employment but also for regularly employed women workers as 
those who are casual workers. 
This gendered pattern of part-time work can be seen clearly for the industry level results 
for 2011-12, given in Table 14. Male part-time work is generally low, but is higher than average 
(other than agriculture) in community services, employment by households, construction and 
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education. Female part-time work is very high in a number of industries apart from agriculture. 
these include (in declining order) manufacturing, community services, employment by 
households, trade, construction, and hotels. Although, part-time work is generally expected to be 
low in regular and salaried work, for women workers, part-time work is very high among women 
workers in community services and employment by households (such work is regular only 
because it carries a monthly remuneration). 
Most part-time work in India is in low remuneration and vulnerable work and is 
conditioned by worker attributes and the demand for such work. In common with homework, 
there are few laws that protect part-time workers and collective organizations and unions are rare 
among such workers. While the available empirical data does not support any systematic trends in 
such work, for females more distinct overall and industry specific trends are available, 
highlighting (as with homework) the increasingly gendered nature of such work. 
Table 14. Percentage of male and female workers reporting part time work industry-wise 












Agriculture 4.8 0.1 4.0 4.5 21.1 1.2 11.2 17.5 
Mining 1.3 0.0 2.8 1.6 70.4 0.0 0.0 6.7 
Manufacturing 2.9 0.4 4.0 2.0 32.5 2.8 15.9 26.4 
Electricity 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.6 100.0 1.2 76.7 2.1 
Construction 1.5 1.9 4.1 3.7 7.9 0.0 14.7 14.4 
Trade 2.6 0.9 5.0 2.4 16.4 4.2 9.5 14.6 
Hotels 2.9 0.2 6.6 2.5 12.9 2.9 17.6 11.4 
Transport 1.2 0.4 3.5 1.1 17.5 1.3 6.6 3.9 
Finance 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.8 31.3 1.4 1.9 8.1 
Real estate 2.3 1.4 4.4 1.9 22.1 1.5 24.8 5.2 
Administration --- 0.2 0.0 0.2 --- 1.6 0.2 1.6 
Education 16.0 2.1 20.3 3.7 48.1 3.0 19.0 8.6 
Health 2.1 0.6 0.0 1.1 27.2 3.4 3.8 6.9 
Community 4.9 1.3 11.2 4.7 20.8 11.5 31.3 18.8 
Household --- 3.4 4.9 3.8 --- 13.4 34.2 17.2 
Total 3.9 0.8 4.1 3.3 23.0 4.6 12.6 17.4 
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6. Contract workers 
6.1. Regulatory framework and data base 
“Contract labourers” are those workers in India who have been hired in connection with 
work in an establishment through a “contractor” whereas a contractor includes both those who 
have undertaken to supply workers for work in an establishment, and undertake any work in an 
establishment to produce a given result with the help of contract labour.6  Elsewhere in the world, 
contract workers are referred to as “dispatch workers or labour dispatch”, “labour brokerage” or 
“temporary agency workers” (ILO, 2015). 
The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, (CLRA) regulates the 
employment of contract labour in establishments in India. The Act does not apply to 
establishments in which work of an intermittent (less than 120 days a year) or seasonal (less than 
60 days a year) nature is performed. The Act defines a contractor and a principal employer. The 
former definition includes both a contractor and sub-contractor, including a works contractor 
undertaking work in the establishment. Workers covered under the Act do not include managerial 
or supervisory workers (drawing more than a certain amount of income) or outworkers. The Act 
provides for establishment of Central and State Advisory Boards.  Under Section 10 of the Act, 
the appropriate government can prohibit the employment of contract labour in any process, 
operation, or work in an establishment after examining the nature of this work. Ordinarily, the use 
of contract labour is intended to be prohibited in “core activities” which are of a perennial nature. 
The Act provides a modicum of protection to such workers by regulating their conditions 
of work, including payment of wages, and social security. Establishments employing more than a 
certain number of contract labourers (usually twenty) as well as contractors supplying more than a 
certain number of contract labourers (again, usually twenty) are required to register with the 
Departments of Labour and furnish regular returns on workers employed, wages and social 
security, as well as facilities provided to such workers.  
Thus, under the law, contract labour which comes under the purview of the CLRA is 
required to be registered and registered contract labour is entitled to certain provision such as 
minimum wages and overtime, as well as social security provisions such as ESIC and the EPF, 
which are built into the provisions of these specific laws/statutes. 
However, contract labourers do not get protection under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1951, 
as well, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which applies to every industrial 
establishment employing more than 100 workers. Both these Acts relate to employment 
protection, and the hiring and firing of workers (including lay off and retrenchment). 
                                                   
6 The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970 defines contract labour and contractor in Clause 2(b) 
and (c) of the Act as follows: “(b) a workman shall be deemed to be employed as "contract labour" in or in 
connection with the work of an establishment when he is hired in or in connection with such work by or through a 
contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer; (c) "contractor", in relation to an establishment, 
means a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods of 
articles of manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any work 
of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor.” 
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Employers have sought removal of Section 10 of the CLRA which under Sub-section (2) 
lays down guidelines for deciding upon the abolition of contract labour in any process, operation 
or other work in any establishment (Sundar, 2010, 2014; Anant, 2009; AIOE, ud). 
Notably India is not a signatory to ILO Convention CO94 (Convention concerning 
Labour Clauses in Public Contracts). This is because the CLRA does not contain provisions 
analogous to provisions in Articles of the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention calls for 
payment of wages, allowances and other conditions of labour which are “not less favourable than 
established for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the district where 
the work is carried on” and lays down the criteria for determining these conditions. 
These issues have been debated in India for many years but amendments to the CLRA 
have not been forthcoming. The Second National Labour Commission (2002), the Tripartite 
Indian Labour Conference, and the Ministry of Labour, as well as have all mooted amendments to 
the CLRA which would provide wages to contract labour on par with regular workers (Sundar, 
2010, 2011; AIOE, nd). The Government of India, since 2000, has been discussing the CLRA in 
the context of the changing requirements of industry in the wake of globalisation. The issue of 
contract labour was widely discussed in the 41st of the Indian Labour Conference (ILC) held in 
2007, and then discussed in the 42nd and 43rd sessions of the Indian Labour Conference in 2009 
and 2010. In the 42nd Session of the Indian Labour Conference a Tripartite Group was 
constituted to examine the provisions in the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 
1970 and to suggest amendment to the Act. But there was no consensus on the proposed 
Amendments with employers opposing equality of wages between contract and regular workers 
and advocating abolition of Section 10 of the Act.7  
However, the State Labour Ministers’ Conference held on 22nd January, 2011, proposed 
to amend the Act and the Ministry mooted this proposal to government in 2011,8 but it was kept 
on hold, pending an examination of its implications. The proposed amendment would have 
entitled contract labour to the same wage rate, holidays, and hours of work and social security 
provisions as regular workers and would have effectively brought the CLRA in sync with the ILO 
Convention, which is restricted to public contracts. However, in the absence of such an 
amendment, the government of India's legislation is not in line with the convention and cannot be 
ratified by it. 
As regards data on contract labour, the Ministry and Departments of Labour do not 
provide data on the numbers of contract labourers, contractors or employers registered with them. 
The All India Organisation of Employers cites a study by the V. V. Giri National Labour Institute 
that out of an estimated 36 million contract workers in India only about six million are covered by 
                                                   
7 Record of proceedings of the ILCs on http://labour.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/Divisions/LC&ILAS. 
8 The Ministry proposed the following provision as amendment to the Act: “In case where the contract labour 
performs the same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly appointed by the Principal Employer, the wage 
rates, holidays, hours of work, social security and other conditions of service of contract labour shall be the same as 
is available to the workmen on the rolls of Principal Employer. In case, same or similar kind of work is not being 
performed by the workmen directly employed by the Principal Employer, the Appropriate Government will notify 
the wage rates, holidays, hours of work, social security and other conditions of service.” 
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the CLRA (AIOE, ud). Data for registrations under the Central Sphere is available from time to 
time and shows that these workers numbered less than a million in 2005-06.9  
The only systematic source of data on contract labour is available for organized 
manufacturing, from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) in which factories registered under 
the Factories Act, 1948, are required to provide data on workers directly engaged by them or 
engaged through contractors. This data leaves out of its purview all establishments not covered by 
the Factories Act as well as all workers in factories not registered as contract workers which is a 
significant omission. 
In the subsequent part of this section, we review some of the studies which deal with the 
employment of contract workers in Indian organised (formal) manufacturing and the impact of 
such employment, and then analyse the trends in the employment of contract workers, based on 
secondary data and unit level analysis of ASI data from selected rounds. We also draw upon the 
results of a recent study of the organized garment industry in the National Capital Region of 
Delhi, and then conclude with a discussion of policy changes on the anvil and the implications of 
these recent patterns for policy. 
 6.2. Labour market rigidity, its impact, and contract workers  
Studies on contract labour in India have linked the use of contract (informal) labour to 
excessive labour market rigidities in India due to employment protection legislations which 
restrict employment termination. The main focus in the literature has been on the provisions of 
Industrial Disputes Act (1947) which places restrictions on individual and collective dismissals. 
Section 15B of the Act which requires factories with more than a hundred workers wanting to 
retrench workers to seek prior permission from workers has been especially singled out in the 
debate.  
Much of the empirical literature in this context tries to show that (a) the Employment 
Protection Legislations (EPL) have led to slowing down of formal employment creation in large 
scale production and higher capital intensity, with employment expanding faster in small-scale 
factories, below 100 workers, or in the unorganized sector (below 10/20 workers); (b) States in 
India with more liberal EPL have experienced faster rate of industrial and employment growth; 
(c) liberalization of labour laws in these states has also led to productivity gains.  
The law regulating the use of contract labour has also been criticized for being unduly 
restrictive, the assumption being that a liberal contract labour law would permit (formal and 
informal) employment to expand faster in the formal sector. Similarly, the Factories Act, which 
also regulates conditions of work in factories, including hours of work and overtime is also 
criticized for not permitting sufficient flexibility to employers. It is also argued that Indian labour 
legislation also lacks sufficient clarity on fixed term employments with termination of workers on 
fixed term contracts also deemed to be within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, 
although recently the courts have stepped in and have given significant freedom to employers to 
hire workers on fixed term contracts (Dougherty, 2008). 
                                                   
9 Agenda notes for the 41st Indian Labour Conference (in proceedings of the ILCs on 
http://labour.gov.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/Divisions/LC&ILAS). 
 
22 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 68 
In terms of the legal framework, OECD studies (Dougherty 2008) have shown that 
comparing India with other countries, Indian labour laws are rigid in a number of respects. The 
OECD methodology evaluates the stringency of a country’s labour regulations in three areas viz 
those for regular (indefinite contracts), for temporary of fixed term contracts, and for collective 
dismissals.  
In early 2007, for regular contracts, Indian labour laws were considered stricter to all but 
two OECD countries. This was mainly due to the restrictions on lay-offs, even for one worker, 
placed by Section 5B of the IDA for all factories with 100 or more workers. If these restrictions 
were not in place, then India would fare at the average level for OECD countries.  This was 
indeed the situation for Indian tertiary sector (Dougherty, ibid.). 
For temporary of fixed term contracts, India is considered to be just above the average for 
OECD countries, mainly because of the relaxation of the contract labour legislation, and the 
permission granted through a Central government notification to allow fixed term contracts for 
white collar workers, and in principle for other regular workers. A Supreme Court judgment of 
2006 has further cleared the ground for renewal of temporary contracts, subject to payment of 
severance payments as per the law (Dougherty ibid.). 
On collective dismissals, India’s labour laws are shown to be particularly inflexible, more 
than any other country, and this was the product of several provisions of the IDA, particularly 
Section 5B (ibid.). 
Most empirical studies on the above issues focus on manufacturing (EPL for services and 
other sectors needs to be considered on a different footing) and use a labour rigidity index for 
Indian states (with or without modification) which was compiled and used by Besley and Burgess 
(2002, 2004) with data for the period 1949 to 1992 for state level amendments to the IDA. This 
index has been severely criticized (Bhattacharjea, 2006, 2009) and its state level rankings have 
also been shown to be inconsistent with other rankings (Papola, Pais and Sahu, 2008, chapter 8). 
More recently, the OECD has also come up with a labour reforms index for Indian states which 
has been based on reforms in eight areas of labour laws and their implementation (Dougherty, 
ibid.) which has been used in a few studies. For other variables, studies use data from the Annual 
Survey of Industries and/or the National Sample Survey. 
One of the issues with using an index of labour rigidity/reform across states is that states 
have been undertaking de facto and de jure changes in labour market regulation at different 
speeds and in different sequences after the period of economic reform. These reforms encompass 
changes in the inspection system, in IDA, in the Contract Labour Act, and in the applicability of 
labour laws to groups of industries (such as Service sector industries, IT, or those located in 
Special Economic Zones) (Papola, Pais and Sahu, 2008; Sundar, 2008; Sharma and Kalpana, 
2008; Banerjee, 2008). Further, de facto changes have occurred due to decline in the availability 
of personnel and resources in the labour departments, and greater willingness of governments and 
the courts to support employers (Papola et al., 2008; Dougherty, 2008; NCEUS, 2009b). 
In a study to analyse the impact of size dependent labour regulations in Indian 
manufacturing, Ramaswamy (2013) has used unbalanced ASI panel data of ASI for the period 
1998-99 to 2007-08. He finds contract worker intensity is found to be higher in size class 50-99 
indicating that firms use contract worker to stay below size threshold of 100. He also finds that 
the average contract-worker intensity of factories in size group 50-99 is found to be higher in 
labour intensive industries located in states categorized as inflexible. He argues that not only does 
the presence of presence of significant threshold effect suggest loss of potential output gain, 
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contrary to the job security enhancement, the employment status of average workers in 
establishment close to 100 workers appear to be worse and more vulnerable. 
In an attempt to study whether firms in stricter labour regulations differentially hire more 
contract workers in response to transitory demand shocks, Chaurey (2013) has used ASI panel 
data from 1998 to 2008 and three rounds of NSS data. Demand shocks are proxied by rainfall 
conditions. Chaurey finds that faced with transitory demand shocks, firms located in pro-worker 
labour regimes differentially hire more contract workers as compared to firms in pro-employer 
regime but there is no difference in the hiring/firing of permanent workers across labour regimes 
in response to demand shocks.  This suggests that contract workers have indeed added more 
flexibility to firms hiring decisions, especially in regions where there are restrictions on the firing 
of permanent workers.   
Goldar and Aggarwal (2012) have used the NSS 61st Round data on employment-
unemployment (2004-05) to examine the impact of import competition and labour market reforms 
at the state level in India on informalization of labour. They find that while Import competition in 
the post-reform period has increased informalization of labour in Indian manufacturing, labour 
market reform at the state level tended to help in the creation of regular salaried/ wage 
employment opportunities in manufacturing.  
Sen, Saha and Maiti (2010) have analysed the determinants of the firm’s choice between 
employment of formal workers and contract workers with special focus on the role of trade 
openness and labour institutions.  They use three digit level ASI data 1998-99 to 2004-05 for 15 
major Indian states. Import penetration and export orientation ratios are calculated using trade and 
industrial output data of the World Bank. Worker’s de jure and de facto bargaining power is 
captured using a modified Besley-Burgess index and the strike to lockout ratio. The results of this 
study show that more pro-worker labour institutions leads to a higher use of contract workers and 
a greater bargaining power of firm management leads to a lower use of contract workers. They 
also show that a higher level of import penetration leads to a rise in the share of contract workers 
to total workers. 
Ahsan and Pages (2007) have studied the economic effects of amendments on different 
types of labour laws as well as of the increasing use of contract labour in India.  They examine 
which type of labour laws matter the most for economic outcomes and differentiate the effects of 
legislations regarding settlement of labour disputes from effects of employment protections laws, 
including restrictions on firm closure. This study also assess whether de facto deregulation 
dampened the effect of labour laws.  They also identify the effect of labour reforms from the 
effect of contemporaneous unobserved policy on macroeconomic changes. They distinguish 
between three types of effects of labour laws - price effect, expropriation effect and rigidity 
effect.  Price effect occurs when regulation increases cost of labour.  Expropriation effects are 
related to holdup problems that occur when labour laws make it easier for workers to appropriate 
part of the returns of employer’s investment once they are sunk.  Rigidity effects occur when 
labour laws make adjustment of labour more costly and difficult.  While price and expropriation 
effect reduces demand for labour, the rigidity effect leads to net employment gains.  They use a 
modified Besley-Burgess index and data for the period 1959-97. Their results show that 
regulations that restrict employer’s ability to adjust employment or that increase the cost of 
solving industrial output are associated with large output losses in the registered sector and an 
expansion of the unregistered sector. Further, strict regulations are associated with firm closures, 
lower investment and reduced output in the registered sector which dries up the demand for 
labour, offsetting any positive effects on worker’s bargaining power brought by the laws. 
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A study by Dougherty (2008) analyses the impact of labour market rigidity on job 
creation and job destruction. Job creation and destruction are measured at aggregate 3 and 5 digit 
levels and hence is probably underestimated. The study concludes that Indian labour reforms at 
the state level had an impact, but were not sufficient to outweigh the negative impact of labour 
market rigidities. It also argues that this rigidity arose not only from the IDA but from the wider 
range of labour laws. It advocates a comprehensive law which offers moderate levels of 
protection to all types of workers and does not discriminate by size of enterprise. The law could 
provide higher compensation for redundancy, and for training. it also advocates a higher use of 
contract labour and fixed term contracts. It also advocates more state level reforms. 
In another paper, Dougherty, Frisancho, and Krishna (2011) analyse ASI panel data and 
find that the modest easing of labour regulations in Indian states in recent years was enough for 
firms in reforming states to benefits substantially through gains in productivity. Plants in labour-
intensive industries and in faster reforming states were much more productive than their 
counterparts in slow reforming states. They also find that larger firms which used more contract 
labour as well as public sector firms which used costly strategies to retrench labour did less well 
than smaller plants and private plants, which experienced largest productivity gains from state-
level labour reforms. 
Hasan and Jandoc (2012) find that states with flexible labour regulations have a greater 
prevalence of large-sized labour intensive forms; although otherwise there is little difference in 
the size distribution of firms across states. This corroborates the main conclusions of the 
Dougherty et al. study (ibid.). However, while Hasan and Jandoc note that the use of contract 
labour has had an adverse impact on the industrial relations climate, their findings do not examine 
the kind of employment that is created in large sized labour intensive firms in flexible states. 
With the exception of Dougherty et al (2011), existing studies do not directly analyse the 
impact of contract labour, although by implication, they show that the association of rigid labour 
laws with contract labour hiring leads to a potential loss of output and decline in the quality of 
employment. 
In a recent and as yet unpublished paper Goldar and Suresh (2014) have explicitly 
analysed both the causes and impacts of contract labour. 
First, in order to study the relationship between labour regulation and extent of use of 
contract labour, they use two digit ASI data of 17 major states for 2010-11 and four alternative 
labour reforms index. They find that (a) the use of contract workers tends to be relatively greater 
in capital intensive industries; (b) no empirical support was found to the view that use of contract 
workers is primarily attributable to labour market rigidities; (c) reforms relating to the factories 
Act tend to reduce the use of contract workers; (d) other reforms tend to raise the use of contract 
workers. 
They further use unit level ASI data for 2006-07 to analyse the impact of the use of 
contract labour on productivity and wages. A Cobb Douglas production is used with labour, 
capital, energy, and materials as inputs, and contract intensity and import intensity as other 
variables. The study finds that the use of contract labour tends to lower productivity and that 
beyond a threshold level, use of imported material has a positive impact on productivity. 
In a related exercise, they find that wage rate has a positive effect on the productivity of 
regular workers. They also find that the wage rate of contract workers has a positive impact on 
wage rate of regular workers, and conversely, the use of contract workers curbs the bargaining 
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power of directly employed workers and hence lowers their wages. They also find that the 
adverse effect of hiring contract workers on the wages of regular workers varies across firms.  It 
is relatively higher in factories paying high wages to regular workers. 
Papola, Sahu and Pais (2008) point out that issues of labour market rigidity dominate the 
academic and much of the policy debate in India, whereas tripartite discussions and various 
Commissions have highlighted two other issues viz. labour market duality and the need to bring 
the excluded segments of informal workers into the regulatory framework, and the need to 
rationalize, simplify, and harmonise existing labour laws (cf. NCEUS 2009, p. 168). Scholars 
have argued that there is increased de facto flexibility in Indian labour markets due to greater use 
of temporary, casual, and contract labour, sub-contracting, weakening of the bargaining power of 
workers, and stronger pro-employer attitudes of governments and courts (Papola et al., 2008; 
Papola, 1994, Bhattacharjea 2006, Ahsan and Pages 2006). As discussed earlier, de facto 
liberalisation of labour laws has also occurred, although not to the extent demanded by industry 
or stressed in many policy documents. 
Papola et al (ibid.) point out that most studies on labour market structures and their 
impacts in India have focused almost exclusively on chapter 5B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 
which deals with retrenchments. They also point out that the results of these studies are not 
unambiguous. The methodological limitations underlying several of the influential studies have 
been discussed by Bhattacharjea (2006). 
Following Papola (1994) and Kannan and Raveendran (2009), the NCEUS (2009) 
suggests that decline and increase in employment has, in fact, taken place, on account of markets 
and technology (ibid.: 172). In fact, several studies suggest that the growth of employment and 
output in Indian manufacturing has to be seen in the light of several factors, including business 
cycles, industrial policies and incentives, availability of infrastructure, and so on, and labour 
institutions are only one of the factors influencing these variables (Neethi, 2008; Anant, 2009; 
D'Souza, 2008). 
However, the Second National Commission on Labour (SNCL) and the NCEUS have not 
disputed the need to change the system of labour regulation in India, also necessitated by the new 
competitive milieu under globalization. Enforcement of the CLRA has weakened with very low 
and declining levels of inspection and a smaller proportion of prosecutions and convictions 
(Anant et al., 2006). NCEUS (2009) has pointed out that State governments have been liberally 
granting permission for lay-offs under Section 5B of the IDA but the Commission has not 
disputed the need to provide employers greater flexibility in relaxing rules for lay-offs or 
retrenchment provided the state can act as an employer of the last resort and social security 
provisions and training provisions can be strengthened. 
In the empirical analysis which follows, we show that recent trends in employment of 
contract labour as well of total employment cast some doubts on the empirical foundations of 
several studies which are based on the premise that growth of contract labour employment is a 
response to the rigidity in hiring workers. In fact, it shows that while on the one hand, contract 
labour serves several functions for employers, on the other, the growth of total employment is 
more a function of overall economic conditions, as has been argued by Papola et al (ibid.). 
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6.3. Trends in hiring of contract workers in organized manufacturing 
Analysis of the ASI data shows that the incidence of contract labour was negligible till 
the early 1970s. By the mid-1980s, about 12.1 per cent of the manufacturing workers were 
engaged through contractors. This percentage increased marginally to 13.5 per cent in 1991-92 
and then fluctuated between 15 and 17 per cent between 1996-97 and 1998-99. In 1998-99, the 
percentage of workers engaged in manufacturing was 15.6. Since 1999-00, there has been a sharp 
increase in contract workers in manufacturing and currently more than a third of the workforce in 
Indian manufacturing – 34.7 per cent in 2011-12 - is engaged through contractors (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Percentage of contract to total workers in organized manufacturing 
 
Source: Computed from unit level ASI data for various years 
Between 1995-96 and 2011-12, along with rising contract intensity, the number of 
contract workers increased from about 900,000 to 3.6 million. However, since most available 
studies are based on data up till the middle of the last decade, it is important to note that this 
entire period was characterized by different growth trends in the employment of directly engaged 
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Figure 3. Total workers, workers engaged directly and through contractors, 1996-97 to 2010-11 
 
Source: Computed from unit level ASI data 
Over the period as a whole, employment of workers in registered manufacturing grew at 
an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent but the employment of workers engaged through 
contractors grew at the rate of 9.4 per cent while that of directly engaged workers grew by only 
one per cent per year (Table 15). 
But as Figure 3 shows, both the numbers of directly engaged workers and total workers 
declined between 1995-96 and 2003-04, and then have shown an increase. While the numbers of 
total workers engaged in organized manufacturing recouped to the 1995-96 level only in 2005-06, 
that of directly engaged workers recouped to the earlier level only in 2008-09. In the face of total 
workforce decline, contract workers effectively substituted for directly engaged workers. As per 
the ASI data, growth rate of employment in organized manufacturing picked up after the growth 
rate of Indian economy accelerated in 2003-04. But interestingly, it maintained this momentum 
even after economic slowdown in 2008-09. 
Table 15. Period-wise annual average growth rates in employment of workers, 1996-97 to 
2011-12  
Period Total workers Contract workers Directly engaged workers 
1996-97 to 2003-4 -1.4 7.1 -3.2 
2004-5 to 2011-12 7.0 11.7 5.1 
1996-97 to 2011-12 2.8 9.4 1.0 
Source: Computed from unit level ASI data 
As Table 15 shows, between 1995-96 and 2003-04, the directly engaged workforce 
declined by 3.2 per cent a year and total worker employment also declined by 1.4 per cent a year 
but contract workers grew by 7.1 per cent a year. But between 2003-04 and 2011-12, total worker 
employment grew at a brisk rate of 7 per cent a year, and the employment of directly engaged 
workers also grew at a very healthy rate of 5.1 per cent a year, while that of contract workers 
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paid employment in organized manufacturing as well as the growth of formal employment, but it 
also shows that informal paid employment grew at a much faster rate in the organized 
manufacturing sector. These trends, contrary to observations in studies, are based on earlier 
trends. While definitions differ, these employment trends are confirmed in several studies (Ghose, 
2014; Mehrotra et al., 2013). 
The latter period has been a period of very high growth and high profits in Indian 
manufacturing as well as high overall growth of the Indian economy, stimulated by growth of the 
international economy, and later by internal stimulus (Srivastava, 2013a). These results 
corroborate the observations of Papola et al. (2008) and Kannan and Raveendran (2009), that the 
growth rate of employment in organized manufacturing depends on a number of factors, including 
market conditions and technological conditions, and not only on constraints imposed by labour 
market rigidity. Although the latter has been reduced by de jure and de facto changes, it remains 
high on international benchmarks. 
One of the main issues in the engagement of contract labour in India is that due to the 
operation of the Industrial Disputes Act, there is a threshold effect (Ramaswamy, 2013) with 
contract intensity higher in firms with less than 100 workers. Further, it is argued that this 
threshold effect leads to an increase in the clustering of firms with less than a hundred workers 
(indeed also in the unorganized sector, i.e. in firms with less than twenty workers without power 
or ten workers with power). 
Figure 4 shows the contract intensity by firm size (in terms of number of workers, 1998-
99 and 2011-12.  In 1998-99, contract intensity did peak for firms employing 50 to 99 workers. 
But this has changed very significantly in recent years. In 2011-12, the largest size firms 
(employing more than 5000 workers) showed the highest contract intensity. 
Figure 4. Contract intensity, by size of factory in terms of number of workers - 1998-99 and 
2011-12 
 










0-9 10_49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000-1999 2000-4999 >5000
Contract Intensity (98-99) Contract Intensity (11-12)
 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 68 29 
Table 16. Factories and workers by factory size-class in 1998-1999 and 2011-2012 
 
Year 
Factory size category in terms of number of workers All 
0-49 50-99 100-499 500-999 >=1000 
 
No of factories (,000) 
      
1998-99 100.4 10.8 10.2 1.2 0.9 123.5 
2011-12 133.1 17.5 18.3 2.7 2.3 173.9 
No of  workers (,000) 
      
1998-99 1409.3 725.2 1857.1 664.4 1649.0 6305.0 
2011-12 1943.1 1201.0 3347.0 1347.4 2603.1 10441.6 
Percentage of factories 
      
1998-99 81.3 8.7 8.2 1.0 0.7 100.0 
2011-12 76.5 10.1 10.5 1.6 1.3 100.0 
Percentage of workers 
      
1998-99 22.4 11.5 29.5 10.5 26.2 100.0 
2011-12 18.6 11.5 32.1 12.9 24.9 100.0 
Source: Same as Table 15. 
Further, while small sized firms continue to predominate in Indian manufacturing, recent 
trends show a clear trend towards declining share of small-sized factories in terms of number of 
factories and employment. The all India figures are given in Table 16.  In absolute numbers, both 
the number of factories and the number of workers employed has grown in all size categories 
between 1998-99 and 2011-12. But the percentage of factories employing less than a hundred 
workers declined from 90 in 1998-99 to 86.6 in 2011-12. The percentage share of factories 
employing more than 500 workers increased from 2.1 to 5 over this period. Medium-large sized 
factories also show significant increases in employment over this period, with increasing 
employment share. Small factories, with less than a hundred workers, employed 33.9 per cent of 
all factory workers in manufacturing in 1998-99, while in 2011-12, the corresponding share was 
30.1 per cent. 
The changing structure of the factory sector, along with the growth of both directly 
engaged and contract workers does not corroborate the view that rigid labour laws are a binding 
constraint on employment expansion or scale expansion in India’s manufacturing sector. At the 
same time, the proliferation of very small units and the extensive and growing use of contract 
workers both in manufacturing and in other sectors remain important policy issues. 
6.4. State level variations in engagement of contract workers 
There are wide inter-state and inter-industry variations in the incidence of contract labour, 
attributed in most of the literature, examined earlier, to labour market rigidities induced by labour 
laws. These variations are shown in Table 17 which shows the percentage of contract labour in 
registered manufacturing in 1996-97 and 2010-11 as well as the per cent point increase in the 
incidence of contract labour over this period.  
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Table 17. Incidence of contract labour (per cent) in organised manufacturing across States 
and per cent-point increase, 1998-1999 & 2011-2012 
Year 1998-99 2011-12 Increase 
Haryana 30.01 50.35 20.34 
Jammu & Kashmir 20.48 49.75 29.27 
Andhra Pradesh 14.78 48.33 33.55 
Odisha 27.22 48.16 20.93 
Bihar 40.44 47.81 7.37 
Uttar Pradesh 22.74 42.44 19.70 
Maharashtra  16.54 40.68 24.13 
Madhya Pradesh 14.02 38.06 24.04 
Rajasthan 21.23 37.18 15.96 
Gujarat 25.17 35.09 9.92 
West Bengal 7.07 33.05 25.98 
Punjab 19.08 28.68 9.60 
Himachal Pradesh 14.21 23.06 8.85 
Karnataka 8.97 21.89 12.92 
Assam 7.65 21.01 13.36 
Tamil Nadu 9.07 19.54 10.48 
Kerala  4.41 14.55 10.14 
Source: Computed from unit level ASI data for 1998-99 and 2010-12. 
Note: The figures for Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are for combined (pre-bifurcation) States, as in 1998-99. 
In 1998-99, Bihar had the highest incidence of contract labour (40.44 per cent), followed 
by Haryana (30.01 per cent), Odisha (27.22 per cent), and Gujarat (25.17 per cent). In 2011-12, 
the states with the highest contract labour incidence were Haryana (50.35 per cent), Jammu & 
Kashmir (49.75 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (48.33 per cent), Odisha (48.16 per cent) and Bihar 
(47.81 per cent). Thus, in these four states, almost half the workers were contract workers. They 
were followed by Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat and West Bengal. In each of 
these states, more than one-third workers in organised manufacturing were contract workers.10 
In Table 18 we have categorized states on the basis of contract intensity in 1999-00 and 
per cent change in this intensity between 1999-2000 and 2010-2011.Most states experienced a 
very increase in contract intensity between these years. The states with the highest per cent point 
increase include Andhra Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Madhya 
Pradesh. Other states which experienced very high change are Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and 
Haryana. Among these states, West Bengal had a very low incidence of contract labour in 1998-
1999. 
                                                   
10 The figures for Andhra Pradesh in 1998-99 differ significantly from those in preceding or succeeding year, which 
are much higher with contract intensities exceeding 40 per cent. 
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Table 18. State level contract intensity and change between 1999-2000 and 2010-2011 
 
Change in contract Intensity (per cent point), 2011-12 over 1998-99 
Level (contract intensity - 
% in 1998-1999) 










AP, MH, MP 
High (20-30) 
 
Gujarat, HP, Rajasthan, 
Punjab 
Odisha, UP J&K 




Source: Computed from unit level ASI data for 1998-99 and 2011-12 
How does the changing incidence of contract labour relate to rigidity in labour laws? As 
mentioned earlier, OECD has prepared a labour reforms index score in early 2007 for 21 states, 
which is based on a number of questions in eight specific areas, including the Contract Labour 
Act. We have calculated the correlation between contract labour incidence in 2011-12 and the 
overall index score as well as the score for reforms in the contract labour Act. The former 
correlation coefficient is -0.05 and the latter is -0.15, both negative and insignificant. 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) below present contract worker incidence in two States – Uttar 
Pradesh and Chhatisgarh, which have the highest and lowest labour reform scores in the OECD 
index. 
The pattern of shift in these two states is quite similar, with a significant increase in 
contract worker incidence in the higher factory size groups. These results again suggest that the 
use of contract labour in industries is not only a response to different degrees of labour market 
rigidity. 
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Figure 5a. Contract worker incidence in UP              Figure 5b. Contract worker incidence in 
Chhattisgarh 
 
Source: Same as Figure 3 
6.5. Industry-wise profile of contract workers 
We have shown above that between 1998-99 and 2011-12, there has been a change in the 
pattern of contract labour hiring across factory size. This pattern holds across a large number of 
industry groups. Further, between 1998-99 and 2011-12, there has been an expansion in contract 
worker hiring across industry groups so that the incidence of contract labour is less concentrated 
in 2011-12 than in 1998-99. 
In 1998-99, the top ten industries with the maximum contract workers accounted for 71.5 
per cent of contract workers while the top twenty industries accounted for 88.3 per cent of 
contract workers. In 2011-12, the top ten industries in terms of numbers of contract workers, 
accounted for 56.2 per cent of contract workers while the top twenty industries accounted for 79 
per cent of the contract workers. 
Table A (Appendix Table) gives contract intensity, percentage of contract workers, and 
change in contract intensity, in 1998-99 and 2011-12 (in descending order of contract intensity in 
2010-11) at the 3-digit NIC code level.  
In 1998-99, industry Group 371 (Recycling of Waste and Scrap) had the highest CI (73.6 
per cent), followed by Group 153 (Manufacture of grain mill products etc.) (38 per cent), Group 
269 - Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products (35.5 per cent) and Group 151 (Production, 
Processing and Preservation of Meat, Fish etc. - 35.4 per cent).  
In 2011-12, building of Ships and Boats (NIC 351) had the highest CI (69.7%), followed 
by Manufacture of Tobacco Products (NIC 160) – 65.5 per cent, Mining and Quarrying (NIC 
142) – 65.2 per cent, Manufacture of Bodies for Motor Vehicles, etc. (NIC 342) – 64.6 per cent. 
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The largest increase in contract intensity appears to have taken place in relatively capital 
intensive industries. Apart from tobacco products, for which as mentioned earlier, estimates for 
1998-99 are exceptionally low, these were these were Mining and Quarrying, Manufacture of 
Coaches,  TV, radio and transmission equipment; Building and Repair of ships, Manufacture of 
Railway locomotives; Motor Vehicle Parts, Manufacture of TV Receivers etc. 
The general issue that arises is why do certain industries resort more to contract labour 
than others? This issue is explored below by analysing some of the possible correlates of contract 
labour hiring in two years (1998-99 and 2011-12). 
We have correlated some of the key industry characteristics (at NIC 3 digit level) to the 
contract intensity in 1998-99 and 2011-12, as well to change in contract intensity between these 
two years (Table 19).  



























intensity   
(1998-1999) 
-0.02 0.124 0.125 
-
0.283*** 
-0.3225** 0.098 0.3595** 
Contract 
intensity   
(2011-2012) 




0.4612* -0.032 -0.061 
0.2743**
* 
-0.079 0.5867* -0.124 
Source: Computed from unit level ASI data for 1999-00 and 2010-11 
Notes: 1. * - significant at 10 per cent level; ** Significant at 5 per cent level, *** Significant at 10 per cent level;  2. Contract 
intensities are correlated with variables values of the same year, whereas change in contract intensity is correlated with base 
year values. 
One may assume that contract labour would be preferred in industries where numerical 
flexibility is important and this could be in industries where numerical requirement is high 
(labour intensive industries), or in industries which face demand fluctuations. Increasing contract 
labour should also reduce capital intensity unless there are other technological confer a cost 
advantage, which would be relevant if wage costs are high in a industry or if wage premium to 
directly engaged employees are high. Of course, other factors such as skill requirement and skill 
gap between directly engaged workers and contract workers could neutralize the cost advantage. 
On the growth side, flexibility to hire contract labour could encourage growth in employment of 
workers and also advantages. The second reason why contract labour may be preferred is that it 
may increase labour productivity – a result shown in some studies. 
These results indicate that:  
• Industries with a high wage to GVA ratio experienced a higher increase in contract intensity 
over time. The correlation is both positive and significant. 
• Share of wage costs in total costs seems to matter. Industries with high wage to total cost 
ratio had a high CI in 1998-99 and such industries also showed a high increase in contract 
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labour hiring over time. As a result, in 2011-12, the correlation between CI and wage /cost 
ratio was no longer significant. 
• On the other hand, labour intensity by itself is not an important correlate of contract intensity 
or changes in it. CI is weakly but positively correlated with capital intensity in the both the 
initial and terminal year. The rise in capital intensity despite this association could be the 
result of independent technological factors. 
• Surprisingly, the wage ratio between directly engaged and contract workers was inversely, 
significantly related to the contract intensity in both years. Industries with a smaller wage 
gap had higher contract intensity. The smaller wage gap in such industries could reflect their 
small skill gap or labour intensive nature. 
• If there is a high differential between directly engaged and contract workers, then firms 
would hire more contract workers. But if there is a large and required skill gap between such 
firms, then they may not go in for a large proportion of contract workers. Results show that it 
is firms with a smaller wage gap that have a higher proportion of contract workers. 
• Growth in number of workers over the time period was significantly correlated with contract 
intensity in 1998-99 but was not correlated with change in contract intensity between 1998-
99 and 2011-12.  This needs a closer examination of pattern of employment growth and 
change in industries (covering both contract and directly engaged workforce). 
• Industries’ growth in Gross Value Added per Worker was significantly related both with 
increase in contract intensity over time, and contract intensity across industries in 2011-12. 
This calls into examination the pertinent factors which may led to growth in GVA per 
worker.  
Broadly, these correlations (or lack thereof) cannot be explained by a narrow set of 
variables, limited, for example, only to the labour market. We need a broader set of explanations 
which include industry specific factors, the (global) economic environment and the pattern of 
demand, and technological factors. 
At the same time, there continue to be significant variations in firm level contract 
intensity within industries. This seems to suggest that firms within an industry can potentially 
follow different strategies with respect to labour hiring even within the same or similar regulatory 
regime and economic environment. These variations are also brought out by a study of the 
organised garment industry in the Delhi National Capital Region which is discussed in the next 
sub-section. The consequences of the diverse hiring practices within an industry is an 
understudied topic so far. 
The analysis made so far has been limited to examining the trends and patterns, causes, 
and possible impacts of contract labour at the macro level. Below, we examine the nature of 
recruitment and of contractors, and the impact of contractor based recruitment on workers and on 
some of the impact on firms (through worker turnover and impact on training and skill 
development) based on field studies in two industries. 
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6.6. Contract labour in the Delhi National Capital Region – the garment and 
construction industries 
Studies on contract work reviewed earlier in this paper based on secondary data, mostly 
drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries. Estimates of contract workers in the ASI are based 
on information provided by factories and can be presumed to tally with the employment record 
maintained by them.  
In what follows, we briefly report some results from a study of labour standards in two 
industries viz, garments and construction carried out in three districts - Delhi, NOIDA and 
Gurgaon, which are part of the Delhi National Capital Region in India and fall in three separate 
provinces - Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Gurgaon. (Srivastava, 2014a, 2014b, ibid.)   
Results discussed here are drawn mainly from the survey of the organised garment 
industry, since the results discussed in earlier sub-sections were also drawn from organized 
manufacturing sector data. The survey was based on interviews with workers, employers, and 
other informants, including contractors and trade unions. About 300 workers were interviewed 
from twenty-six factories and eight workshops in the Delhi Capital region (Delhi, Gurgaon, 
NOIDA). Each of the workshops were large enough to be registered as factories but had evaded 
registration due to peripheral location. In order to find out details of the labour laws and their 
implementation, and details of information furnished by contractors and employers covered in the 
survey,  information was also sought from the labour law under a transparency law (Right to 
Information Act) and this was tallied with the information collected from other sources. 
While none of the states furnished information on the “core” and “non-core” functions in 
the garment industry, and whether this distinction had been changed, the information based on 
applications filed by contractors for registration with the department, shows clearly that all 
manufacturing processes in the garment industry were treated as non-core in all three states, and 
contract labour was permitted across the board, after due registration of employers and 
contractors.  
All the factories covered in the survey had more than fifty workers, and most had more 
than 100 workers for the most part of the year. These were categorised as small, medium and big 
on the basis of employment size.  
The survey identified four types of recruitment processes: (i) Direct hiring by firms or 
managers; (ii) Hiring through in house labour contractors who could be employees of the firm, 
and could either be licensed or unlicensed contractors; (iii) Hiring through external labour 
contractors, who could again be licensed or unlicensed; (iv) Work Contractors - who could 
function in-house and hence whose employees would be within the purview of the Contract 
Labour Act, or could be outsourced work contractors (jobbers). But recruitment practices varied 
between firms. 
In most factories, five to twenty per cent workers were directly engaged, but in seven 
factories all workers were found to be engaged directly. Directly engaged workers were either 
casual worker or regular workers, generally on oral contracts. Thirteen of the factories covered in 
the survey had licensed contractors. But not all workers recruited and supplied by them were 
officially on their rolls, and hence not all such workers received social security. Fifteen firms had 
unlicensed contractors, usually supplying twenty to fifty workers. These were on separate muster 
rolls and did not receive any social security. Two in-sourced work contractors were covered in the 
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survey, both licensed, one of which had most workers on its rolls who also received social 
security. Only 1.7 per cent workers surveyed had written contracts, but 47.4 per cent were on 
indefinite oral contracts, while the rest were casually employed. 
Workers employed through unlicensed contractors, and some proportion of workers 
employed through licensed contractors, or even directly engaged, were not on the main rolls of 
the contractor and/or factory, with their muster rolls and/or attendance sheets being maintained 
separately. These workers cannot, therefore, also be picked up in ASI data, which therefore most 
likely, underreports on contract workers, on total number of workers, and the most vulnerable 
section of the workers. The survey could not obtain an accurate estimate of such workers, but 
proxies, such as percentage of workers not reporting mandatory deductions for provident fund or 
health insurance (through subscription to the Employees State Insurance Corporation) could be 
used as proxy indicators.  
The study found that working conditions were usually poorer for contract workers. 
Working hours were long for all workers, but longer for those recruited by contractors. While 
37.8 per cent directly engaged workers received double overtime, only 5.3 per cent workers 
engaged by contractors received double overtime.  No contract worker had a formal written 
contract. Contract workers and casual workers were worse off in terms of weekly holidays, paid 
leave, access to medical facilities and exposure to occupational health risks. While 61.5 per cent 
directly engaged workers made provident fund contributions, only 21.3 per cent contract workers 
made these contributions. In large, medium and small firms, 90.8 per cent, 92.7 per cent and 45.7 
per cent directly engaged workers made provident fund contributions (this percentage being 
higher among regular workers than among casual workers), only 23.1 per cent, 40 per cent and 
11.8 per cent contract workers in these firms respectively made these contributions. 
But in terms of wages, the study found very little wage gap between take home wages of 
directly engaged and contract workers (see also Meenakshi, 2009). However, when social security 
contributions were added back, gross wages of directly engaged workers in the factory sector 
were found to be higher. A surprising result of the study was that in the garment industry, in 
terms of "Cost to Company", contract labour was not cheaper for employers (cost to company 
comprised gross wages, including social security payments, and commission to contractors, but 
did not include bonus and long term benefits). Thus cheap labour (excluding the long term 
cumulative benefits) could not have been a driver of contract labour employment in this industry. 
The worker turnover rate in the industry was very high. Only about 40 per cent workers 
in the industry had worked with their current enterprise for more a year, while 59.9 per cent 
workers interviewed had worked in the current enterprise for less than a year, while 38.8 per cent 
had worked in the current enterprise for less than 6 months. Among workers recruited by 
contractors, 75.5 per cent had worked in the current enterprise for less than a year, while as many 
as 58.5 per cent had worked in the current enterprise for less than 6 months. 
This had implications for the training profile of the workers and training provided by 
firms. Although large firms claimed that they were running training programmes, these were 
accessible to a very small number of directly engaged regular workers. 
The main survey carried out in 2012-13, was followed by a resurvey of the units in 2013-
14. The resurvey reported that, within a year, some employers had changed recruitment strategies, 
between types of contractors, as also between contractor-based recruitment and direct recruitment 
(in both directions).  The survey found that the organized garment industry had largely been able 
to dispense with its permanent labour force.  The “core” labour force, although more or less in 
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regular employment is not treated as permanent. Employers can “mix and match” contracts to 
achieve near-complete labour flexibility. The “infamous” Industrial Dispute Act which provides 
employment protection to workers now exists only on paper. 
The use of contractors in the garment industry contrasted with their functions in the 
construction industry. In the construction industry, in which almost the entire labour force 
consisted of contract labour, recruitment was carried out through a chain of contractors, with the 
principal contractors being located either in the areas of origin, or at destination. Since labour was 
mobilized over long distances, contractors bore recruitment and search costs, but also maintained 
a tight control on the workforce, while the division of work allocation and supervisory functions 
between them and the firm sub-ordinates could vary. 
In the organized garment industry in the National Capital Region, almost all recruitment 
were made at destination, most often at the factory gates. The principal role of contractors in the 
garment industry in the NCR was not so much in facilitating recruitment and reducing 
recruitment costs.  But they manage the employment and deployment of workers, both on and off 
the company rolls, providing a flexible labour force, but also helping to make the directly 
engaged labour force more flexible. To some extent, they reduced overall current wage costs, but 
this impact appears to be small.  
Primarily, the use of contractors lowered the overall transaction cost for firms, introduced 
coercive elements in disciplining the labour force, increased labour flexibility, and segmented and 
fragmented the workforce, reducing the possibility of worker solidarity. The use of contractors 
also reduced the possibility of firm or industry level bargaining, and reduced the long term fixed 
wage costs for firms in terms of retirement benefits or retrenchment compensation to workers. 
6.7. The changing nature of the contractors 
While in the above sub-section, we have drawn out some aspects of the labour 
contracting process and its impact on workers, mainly based on fieldwork in the garment industry 
in the Delhi NCR, we now use the results of the above study on garments and construction, and 
another study of the construction industry to examine the profile of labour contractors in these 
two industries (Srivastava, 2013b, 2014b, ibid.). The labour contracting system shows changes 
over the years, with much greater concentration now visible both in its organised and unorganised 
segments.  The construction sector is still dominated by individual labour contractors who can 
either be quite small (employing anything up to a few scores of workers at one or more site) or 
quite large, deploying anything from a few hundred or up to a few thousand workers in several 
sites. The principal contractors operate either in the areas of origin, sourcing workers through 
smaller sub-contractors and agents, or at the destination, with workers being sourced through a 
network of agents. Smaller contractors recruit workers either from source areas, or locally - 
through networks or from local labour markets. There are three overlapping legislations in which 
employers and contractors should register themselves and the workers employed. These are the 
Interstate Migrant Workers' Act, 1979, the CLRA, and the Building and Other Construction 
Workers Act, 1996. But the two studies of construction workers in the Delhi National Capital 
region (Srivastava, 2013b, 2014a) found, that with the exception of a single contracting firm 
(which was a works contractor) which had registered under the CLRA, none of the other 
contractors had obtained registration under any of the legislations. This is despite the fact that the 
firms, in all cases, (principal firms) were medium and large public sector and private sector 
entities.  
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In the garment sector, the firms that were studied ranged from small (employing a 
hundred to three hundred workers) to large (employing more than 800 workers). The contractors 
(briefly discussed in the previous section) ranged from small to very large, and from those 
operating on an informal and unregistered basis, to organised firms supplying labour or on-site 
work contract to several large factories at a site. But the relationship between contractor, firm and 
worker was not a simple three-way relationship in many cases, with the contractor often also 
performing the role of production manager, master tailor, accountant etc. in a factory, and being a 
salaried employee of a factory, in addition to the role as a registered or unregistered contractor or 
firm. 
In general, three main facts can be observed in the change in the nature of labour 
contractors. The first is the growth in concentration in the labour contracting agencies, with an 
observable growth in the organised segment of the industry. This has occurred principally in 
services and manufacturing.11 The second is the enormous fluidity in the roles played by 
contractors and the nature of arrangements between them and the principal employers. While the 
former is partially helpful in workers accessing some of the benefits under the CLRA, the latter 
brings into place arrangements which in general reduce the bargaining power of the workers and 
the benefits that they would otherwise be entitled to. The third is the continued presence of 
informal labour contracting arrangements, both as sub-contractors and as (smaller) principal 
contractors. In the last case, the workers employed remain undocumented and unrecorded (also, 
therefore, influencing studies on employment in the organised sector) and these workers do not 
gain access to any of the benefits and protection under law. 
6.8. Conclusion: Contract workers in India 
The limited data that is available for the organised manufacturing sector shows that there 
has been a phenomenal increase in the numbers of workers engaged through contractors. A very 
large numbers of outworkers work under sub-contracting arrangements, and many workers in the 
organised sector remain outside the purview of the CLRA. There is no estimate available of such 
workers. 
The contract labour system serves a number of objectives for employers which are not 
confined to increasing numerical flexibility alone. It cannot be seen simply as a response to rigid 
employment protection laws, particularly in recent years. Over time, the laws and their 
implementation for contract workers has been relaxed, permitting the huge burgeoning of contract 
workers. Although contract workers reduce short-term and long-term wage costs to employers, 
the employment of contract workers also carries costs, clearly in terms of working conditions and 
wages for workers and discriminatory treatment at the workplace, but also apparently in terms of 
both in terms of industrial performance and productivity. as the AIEO (n.d.) itself admits, and is 
also brought out by several other studies, the use of contract workers and their treatment in 
                                                   
11 The AIOE (n.d.) citing reports by Executive Recruiters Association and Ernst and Young notes that a large 
number of staffing  companies, who are more organised than the usual contractors, had mushroomed in recent years 
to provide manpower solution to industries. This human resource industry grew at a compound rate of 21 per cent 
between 2011-2015, with a turnover of around Rs. 22,800 crore. Out of the total manpower supplied by the HR 
industry, 73 per cent comprises of temporary workforce. One of the largest worker contracting firms to service 
sector firms in India, Teamlease, contracted out  60,000 workers in late 2011 (Bajaj 2011) and 1.5 million workers 
to more than 2,200 clients by April 2015 (http://www.teamlease.com/about-us/about-teamlease/ downloaded on 
April 10, 2015). 
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workplaces may have reduced the possibility of workers raising disputes through the formal 
industrial relations mechanisms but it has increased the possibility of high intensity and violent 
industrial conflicts (AIOE ibid.; Sundar, 2011; Dougherty et al., 2011). 
7. Impact of non-standard forms of employment on 
workers 
There are detailed industry level studies as well as macro-empirical studies which 
examine the impact of non-standard forms of employment (casual work, homework, informal 
work) on working conditions, remuneration, safety standards, rights of workers to seek redressal 
and to form unions and associations. The NCEUS (2007) report on conditions of work in the 
unorganised sector extensively analyses and documents the conditions of casual workers in 
agriculture and non-agriculture, regular but informal workers, and homeworkers. These 
conditions are compared to benchmarks such as minimum wages or poverty line level of 
consumption expenditure. The NCEUS report focuses on all informal workers, whether waged or 
self-employed, and whether employed in the organized sector, or in the unorganized sector. 
Workers in the unorganized sector the Indian economy experience large deficits in working 
conditions and other labour standards, but these are more or less across the board and are linked 
to low productivity and absence of regulation.  
In contrast, the organized sector of the economy is regulated more comprehensively and 
has higher productivity. In order to examine the impact of non-standard forms of employment on 
workers, we have, therefore, carried out an exercise which has been restricted to paid workers 
who work in organized sector establishments, where due to a better regulatory framework, 
greater size and scale we expect better labour standards for workers in general. In India, in the 
manufacturing sector, regulation regarding conditions of work kicks off for factories which 
employ ten or more workers with power, or twenty or more workers without power. In non-
manufacturing sectors, most regulation becomes operational for establishments with twenty or 
more workers/employees. In the exercise carried out for this paper, we have restricted ourselves 
uniformly to factories and establishments with twenty or more employees. Further NSFE is 
identified by activity status (regular/casual) and the existence of written contracts. A further 
classification is made between employees holding long-term contracts and those holding short-
term contracts. Most NSFE categories employed by such establishments would fall in the 
categories of employees holding short-term contracts or no contracts, or casual workers. We do 
not deal with dependent workers or part-time workers here. 
This analysis reported below is, therefore, restricted to an estimated 17.6 million workers 
in 2011-12 who were employed by the organized non-farm sector, in establishments employing 
twenty or more workers. Overall, 40.6 per cent of such workers were casual workers, 38.3 per 
cent were regular workers without any written contract, while 21.1 per cent had a written contract, 
of which 18.8 per cent had contracts of more than a year’s duration while 2.3 per cent had a short 
term contract (one year or less).  
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Table 20. Percentage of non-farm wage/salaried workers in 20+ worker establishments, by 






















% to All 
workers 
1 
Legislators, Sr. officers, 
managers 
38.6 1.3 58.4 1.7 3.6 
2 Professionals 47.7 5.8 45.6 1.0 10.2 
3 
Technicians & assoc. 
professionals 
46.6 3.6 48.5 1.3 9.5 
4 Clerks 42.6 4.9 50.0 2.6 7.9 
5 
Service workers & shop & 
Mkt. sales workers 
28.2 1.7 61.1 9.0 7.9 
6 Skilled ag. & fishery workers 26.2 3.0 22.3 48.4 0.7 
7 
Craft & related trade 
workers 
2.7 1.3 25.3 70.7 24.9 
8 
Plant & machine operators 
& assemblers 
8.5 1.1 78.6 11.8 8.8 
9 Elementary occupations 3.7 1.2 18.1 77.0 26.5 
X Workers not classified 26.2 0.0 59.6 14.2 0.1 
 Total 18.8 2.3 38.3 40.6 100.0 
Source: Computed from NSS unit records, 68th round (2011-12), schedule 10 (employment - unemployment) 
The distribution of these different categories of workers across occupation groups is 
given in Table 20. Casual workers were concentrated in three occupation groups at the lower skill 
levels  viz. Skilled Agriculture and Fishery Workers, Craft and Related Trade Workers, and 
Elementary Occupations (Codes 6, 7, and 9) which comprise 66.2 per cent of all non-farm 
wage/salaried workers in such establishments. Workers in the high skill occupation groups 1 to 5, 
particularly in the first three groups, had a high proportion of regular workers with longer term 
written contracts. Short term contracts were sparse across all skill categories, but were relatively 
higher in skill codes 2 to 4. 
7.1. Access to social security 
We have earlier seen that access to social security is low among home workers (who are 
generally not covered by social security provisions), informal workers (who may be partly 
entitled to such provisions) and contract workers (who are entitled to them). Following the work 
of the NCEUS (2007), Srivastava (2012b), Srivastava and Naik (2015) and other scholars have 
shown that due to the increasing informalization of the workforce, an higher proportion of paid 
workers in India are without any access to social security. In the category that we are discussing 
in this section, all workers should be entitled to some social security provisions. 
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Table 21. Percentage workers in establishments employing 20 or more workers with any form of 
social security (2011-2012) 
Occupational Category 







> 1 year 
Written 
contracts 






Legislators, sr. officers, managers 90.3 81.0 89.8 75.3 1.4 84.1 
Professionals 90.7 53.2 87.6 66.3 0.3 79.2 
Technicians & assoc. professionals 88.4 29.9 82.0 62.1 5.5 74.4 
Clerks 92.3 47.0 88.9 55.3 3.2 76.4 
Service workers & shop & mkt. sales 
workers 
84.9 55.1 82.5 49.2 0.4 65.6 
Skilled ag. & fishery workers 88.4 0.0 73.4 45.2 8.6 47.3 
Craft & related trade workers 90.0 56.7 86.4 36.2 4.0 32.1 
Plant & machine operators & assemblers 87.8 51.0 85.5 22.6 4.3 37.6 
Elementary occupations 76.8 41.6 72.7 22.4 1.8 19.9 
Workers not classified 90.1 
 
90.1 8.2 0.0 38.4 
All employees 88.3 47.7 84.8 41.8 2.8 49.9 
Source: Computed from NSS unit records, 68th Round (2011-12), Schedule 10 (Employment - Unemployment). 
However, as Table 21, while 88.3 per cent of regular workers with longer term contracts 
had some form of social security, the percentage came down drastically to 47.7 even for worker 
with short term contracts. Only 41.8 per cent regular workers without contracts accessed some 
social security while only 2.8 per cent casual workers in these establishments had any social 
security. Overall, just about half the workers in these establishments accessed any form of social 
security. 
At higher skill levels, a higher percentage of workers – even regular workers without any 
written contract - accessed social security, three-quarters or more of the workers in the top four 
NCO groups, but this percentage is lower for lower occupation categories and only 19.9 per cent 
workers in elementary occupations had any social security. There are, therefore, sharp differences 
not only across standard and non-standard forms of employment, but also, in the case of informal 
regular jobs, between skill-based occupation categories. 
A probit regression to test how the paid workers’ employment characteristics and other 
characteristics affect the probability of accessing any form of social security has been carried out. 
The characteristics used are: whether the worker is in a standard employment relation of not 
(defined here as a regular worker having a written contract); the occupation-cum-skill category; 
industrial category; sex; and caste status. The results reveal that the probability of receiving any 
form of social security is lower for the workers who engaged in semi-skilled or lower skilled 
occupations vis-à-vis those who are engaged in highly skilled occupations. As envisaged, workers 
in non-standard employment have less probability of enjoying the benefits of social security as 
compared to workers in standard employment. Gender and industrial classification also seems to 
be an important determinant of social security benefits. The results reveal that, on an average, a 
woman worker has a lower probability of getting the social security benefits vis-à-vis their male 
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counterparts. In case of major industrial classifications, the probability that a worker gets social 
security benefits increases if the worker is engaged either in manufacturing sector or the services 
sector in comparison to the construction sector. With regards to caste affiliation, the workers from 
SC, ST as well as “Others” as the social group have a higher probability to enjoy the social 
security benefits vis-à-vis the workers belonging to other backward caste category. All the results 
are statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance barring for the workers from SC 
category, which is statistically insignificant. 
Table 22. Results of probit regression for access to any social security among employees in non-
agriculture, 2011-2012 
Dep var: Social 
security benefit 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Coef. Std. error Z P>|z| dydx Std. error Z P>|z| 
Semi-skilled 
Occupations  
-1.32 0.02 -78.96 0.00 -0.23 0.00 -90.66 0.00 
Low-skilled 
Occupations 
-0.54 0.02 -33.44 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -34.28 0.00 
Informal sector 
worker 
-0.96 0.01 -77.48 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -86.96 0.00 
Others 0.20 0.01 14.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 14.07 0.00 
SC 0.03 0.02 1.42 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.16 
ST 0.44 0.02 23.87 0.00 0.08 0.00 24.06 0.00 
Female -0.40 0.01 -26.93 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -27.2 0.00 
Service sector 1.57 0.02 78.89 0.00 0.27 0.00 84.8 0.00 
Manufacturing sector 1.67 0.02 79.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 85.15 0.00 
Constant -0.64 0.02 -26.85 0.00 
    
Number of obs 91628 
LR chi2(9) 42938.42 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.4293 
7.2. Average weekly earnings 
Table 23 gives the estimated weekly earnings for the different categories of regular 
workers and for casual workers across skill level, thus controlling for skill differences. For all 
workers, there is a clear differential, with regular workers having long term contracts earning an 
estimated Rs 5016 per week, followed by regular workers with short term contracts (Rs 3380 per 
week), regular workers with no contracts (Rs 2574 per week), and casual workers (Rs 900 per 
week). These differentials also exist within occupation categories, although for some categories, 
regular workers with no contracts have higher average earnings than those with short term 
contracts. In elementary occupations, where the largest percentage (26.5) workers are 
concentrated, while regular workers with long term contracts earn Rs 2423 per week, those with 
short term contracts earn Rs 1434 per week, and those without contracts earn Rs 1226 per week. 
Casual workers in elementary occupations earn only Rs 867 per week. Among service workers, a 
middle level occupational category, regular workers with longer term contracts earn Rs 3801 per 
week, while those with short term contracts earn Rs 1539 per week and those without contracts 
earn Rs 2074 per week. Casual work in service workers earns Rs 1011 per week. 
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Table 23. Average weekly earnings of workers in establishments employing 20 or more workers, 
2011-2012 (Rs) 
Occupation group 







contract     




contract of    






Legislators, Sr. Officers, Managers 9842 8611 6882 752 8706 
Professionals 7088 7254 5257 1083 6378 
Technicians & Assoc. Professionals 4864 2600 3545 1482 4221 
Clerks 4106 2411 2721 1066 3526 
Service Workers & Shop & Mkt. Sales 
Workers 
3801 1539 2074 1011 2858 
Skilled Ag. & Fishery Workers 3219 892 1752 893 2012 
Craft & Related Trade Workers 3522 2462 1680 887 1765 
Plant & Machine Operators & 
Assemblers 
3523 2104 1672 1081 2095 
Elementary Occupations 2423 1434 1226 867 1294 
Total 5016.13 3379.62 2573.86 899.63 3242.32 
Source: Computed from NSS unit records, 68th Round (2011-12), Schedule 10 (Employment - Unemployment) 
Note: Occupation category is based on current weekly status. 
 
These differences reflect the endowments/characteristics of different categories of 
workers, as also differentials due to employment status (discrimination). In order to analyse the 
wage penalty which workers in non-standard employment could be subject to, we have analysed 
the differential in earnings of two groups of employees viz. casual workers and regular workers 
with no written contract (considered as non-standard employees, also categorised by us as 
informal employees) and workers with written contracts (standard employees).  
Table 24. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for wage penalty, 2011-12 
Mean prediction high (H) 8.048 
Mean prediction low (L) 7.027 
Raw differential (R) {H-L} 1.02 
due to endowments (E) 0.479 
- due to coefficients (C) 0.469 
due to interaction (CE) 0.073 
Unexplained (U){C+(1-D)CE} 0.469 
Explained (V) {E+D*CE} 0.551 
% unexplained {U/R} 45.9 
% explained (V/R) 54.1 
The decomposition methodology given by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) and used in 
a number of studies to examine the wage penalty of informally employed workers (Marcouiller, 
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1997; Heitmueller, 2007) has been used here. The following characteristics of the workers have 
been used as a starting point, so as to see how well they explain wages: age, experience (age 
squared as a proxy), different levels of educational attainment (proxy for skills and eligibility 
requirements), sex, and social group of the workers. The premiums are substantial for formal 
sector workers vis-à-vis informal as the mean log wage rate of formal workers is 1.020 higher 
than mean log wage rate of informal workers. Using Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, this 
difference can be divided between differences in characteristics and differences in rewards to 
these markets (wage penalty). Approximately 54 per cent of the wage differential can be 
accounted for by differences in characteristics, whereas differences in rewards (wage penalty) 
accounts for approximately 46 per cent of the wage gap. 
 
Table 25. Regression results: Wages estimation  –  standard and non-standard employment  –   
all non-agricultural employees, 2011-12 
Table 25 shows the significant results from the estimation of wages for the formal and the 
informal sector respectively. The regression results reveal that there exists an inverted U 
relationship between age and earnings but the predicted turning point occurs beyond the working 
life span of both formal and informal workers (at ages 81 and 65 respectively). As the age 
increases by a year, keeping all other things constant, the average weekly earnings of an informal 
worker increases by Rs.4. However, for a regular worker with written contract, an additional year 
of age increases the weekly earnings by Rs.6. The male informal sector workers are found to earn 
significantly higher wages than their female counterparts in the labour market. This is found to be 
the case for regular (with contract) workers as well and therefore, it signals towards the widely 
documented gender wage disparity in Indian labour market (Sengupta and Das, 2014). As 
envisaged, on an average the weekly earnings are higher for all the categories of literate workers 
vis-à-vis illiterate or less educated worker (below primary) and the average weekly earnings for a 
more educated worker is more than a relatively less educated informal sector worker. A similar 
pattern can also be observed for the formal sector workers but the returns to education are higher 
for informal than formal sector workers. All the results are statistically significant at 1 per cent 
Variables Standard Employees Non-standard employees 
Dep Var: log_wage Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Age 0.06 0.00 13.73 0.00 0.04 0.00 18.83 0.00 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 -7.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.13 0.00 
Female -0.35 0.01 -24.93 0.00 -0.53 0.01 -58.10 0.00 
Primary & secondary education 0.08 0.03 2.63 0.01 0.14 0.01 15.82 0.00 
Secondary and higher secondary 0.46 0.03 16.33 0.00 0.40 0.01 41.00 0.00 
Graduate and above 0.89 0.03 31.91 0.00 1.04 0.01 94.80 0.00 
Scheduled tribe -0.01 0.02 -0.90 0.37 0.07 0.01 6.08 0.00 
Scheduled caste -0.16 0.02 -8.73 0.00 -0.11 0.01 -10.95 0.00 
Other backward caste -0.19 0.01 -13.70 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -10.02 0.00 
Constant 5.82 0.09 64.26 0.00 5.92 0.04 159.09 0.00 
Number of obs  17078       41762       
F(  9, 17068)   735.35       1912.58 
Prob > F       0.0000       0.0000 
R-squared  0.2794       0.2919 
Adj R-squared  0.279       0.2918 
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level of significance. The mean weekly wages are lower for the backward caste categories like 
Scheduled Caste and Other Backward Categories vis-à-vis the forward caste given by “Others” 
for both formal and informal workers. The result for formal sector workers from ST social group 
is statistically insignificant but for informal workers it is positive and significant at 1 per cent 
level of significance which implies that the mean weekly wages of ST informal sector worker is 
higher than a person from “Others” caste category. 
Using a similar methodology, we have also examined the wage differences between the 
two groups of regular workers: regular workers without any written contract (non-standard 
regular employees), and regular workers with a written contract. The mean log wage rate of the 
former is 0.886 higher than mean log wage rate of the latter. Using Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, this difference can again be divided between differences in characteristics and 
differences in rewards to these markets (wage penalty). Approximately 54 per cent of the wage 
differential can be accounted for by differences in characteristics, whereas differences in rewards 
(wage penalty) again accounts for approximately 46 per cent of the wage gap. 
Table 26. Percentage of workers employed in establishments with 20+ workers who are members 
of unions / associations 
  Regular Workers 
casual 
all 







Agriculture (non-farm) 88.0   88.0 9.1 10.5 24.4 
Mining 80.1   80.1 6.1 2.0 7.7 
Manufacturing 46.1 30.9 43.0 8.3 4.3 9.3 
Water supply, sewerage, waste collection 55.8 16.2 54.9 38.4 0.0 46.1 
Construction 79.2 0.0 75.2 13.1 4.6 5.6 
Wholesale & retail trade, repair of MVs 24.4 0.0 18.9 5.6 23.2 10.1 
Transport, storage, posts 55.6 2.9 44.5 29.6 13.3 30.2 
Accommodation & food service 26.0 0.0 14.5 1.7 11.7 4.5 
Information & communication 29.3 2.1 19.3 20.5   20.0 
Financial & insurance services 70.8 31.7 67.2 41.6 0.0 55.3 
Real estate 0.0     0.0   0.0 
Professional & scientific activities 79.3 0.0 59.8 17.7 0.0 27.5 
Admin & support services 56.4 10.2 53.1 4.3 0.0 22.9 
Public admin & defence 73.3 17.3 71.7 55.6 16.9 65.6 
Education 68.3 18.9 64.7 25.7 1.7 47.2 
Health & social service 61.8 7.4 59.9 7.4 0.0 24.0 
Arts & entertainment 42.7   42.7 11.4 0.0 14.6 
Other service activities 38.7 0.0 21.9 22.5 0.3 17.3 
Activities of households as employers 0.0   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All industries 63.9 13.5 58.6 16.5 5.0 20.7 
Source: Computed from NSS unit records, 68th Round (2011-12), Schedule 10 (Employment - Unemployment). 
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7.3. Membership of unions or associations 
Workers in non-standard forms of employment find it very difficult to form unions or 
associations because of job insecurity, segmentation and fragmentation, employer’s force, an 
absence of pre-existing collective organizations in their vicinity.  
Estimates from the NSS 2011-12 survey, given below in Table 26, show that while 63.5 
per cent regular workers with longer term contracts were members of any union or association in 
India, only 13.5 per cent regular workers with short-term contracts, and 16.5 per cent regular 
workers with written contracts were members of any association/union. Among casual workers in 
organized sector establishments, only 5 per cent workers were members of a union or association. 
There are also differences across industries and sectors. There is much smaller membership of 
unions/associations even among workers with long term contracts in industries which are almost 
exclusively private sector dominated or where union membership is restricted by law – Real 
Estate, Wholesale and retail trade, Accommodation and Food Service and Information and 
Communication.  
Unionisation rates in organized manufacturing are shown to be very low according to 
these estimates. Only 9.3 per cent workers in manufacturing establishments with more than 20 
workers were members of any association / union. This gives the effective outer bound of workers 
who could potentially benefit from employment protection legislation.  
7.4. Formal skill training 
The prevalence of formal skill training in India is low, even among workers in the 
organized sector, and most workers acquire their skills through informal routes. Where 
employment relationships are not stable, employers are likely to have little incentive to invest in 
workers’ skills. This is borne out by figures of formally trained workers, given in Table 27. Only 
4.5 per cent workers in these establishments had received training and another 1.4 per cent was 
receiving some formal training. At the aggregate level, the percentage of workers already tarried 
was higher for all categories of regular workers with any contract  - 8.2 per cent among those with 
longer-term contracts, 10.1 per cent with those with short term contracts, while 5.9 per cent 
workers without any contract were trained and only 1 per cent casual workers had acquired any 
training. For those receiving any training, regular workers with long term contracts again fared 
comparatively better with 2.6 per cent such workers receiving formal training, compared to only 
0.7 per cent workers with short term contracts and 1.5 per cent workers with no contracts and 0.8 
per cent casual workers.  
Formal training was much higher among some of high skill occupational groups – 
Technicians and Associate Professionals and Professionals, followed by clerks and Plant and 
Machine Operators and Assemblers. In service training was the highest among Professionals, 
possibly because such training is a part of the internship programme in professional courses. 
To conclude: the analysis in this section, along with the discussion in the preceding 
sections, shows that NSFE not only implies higher job and income insecurity for most workers in 
this category, such workers also have much lower access to social security, lower remuneration, 
lower possibilities of formal training, and much less likelihood of having a collective voice. In 
short, such workers suffer from a significantly higher decent work deficit compared to their 
counterparts in similar jobs. 
 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 68 47 
Generally speaking, the training figures tell us the same story. Casual workers do not 
have the wherewithal or incentive to go for formal training while regular workers with long term 




Table 27. Percentage of employees in establishments with 20 or more workers who have received or are receiving formal training, by 
occupation category, 2011-2012 
Single digit occupation group 
Regular workers 
with written 
contract > 1 year 
Regular workers 
with written 
contract          
<=1 year 
Regular workers 
with any written 
contract 
Regular workers 
with no written 
contract 

























Legislators, sr. officers, 
managers 
0.7 5.0 0.0 30.1 0.7 5.7 0.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.2 
Professionals 4.9 10.1 0.0 6.6 4.4 9.7 4.6 10.2 28.1 0.6 4.7 9.8 
Technicians & assoc. 
professionals 
1.9 13.0 1.7 14.2 1.8 13.0 3.5 15.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 13.9 
Clerks 3.8 7.8 1.5 14.8 3.5 8.5 1.2 6.8 10.8 0.0 2.6 7.4 
Service workers & shop & mkt. 
sales workers 
1.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.2 0.7 2.8 0.0 4.3 0.8 2.8 
Skilled ag. & fishery workers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 2.5 
Craft & related trade workers 0.7 9.6 0.0 9.2 0.5 9.5 0.4 5.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 2.4 
Plant & machine operators & 
assemblers 
0.0 5.8 3.0 34.3 0.4 9.1 1.0 3.7 0.0 7.2 0.8 4.7 
Elementary occupations 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8 
Workers not classified 0.0 0.0     0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 2.6 8.2 0.7 10.1 2.4 8.4 1.5 5.9 0.8 1.0 1.4 4.5 
Source: Computed from NSS unit records, 68th Round (2011-12), Schedule 10 (Employment - Unemployment). 
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Thus, employees with NSFE experience from various deficits and gaps in comparison to 
workers other workers. This result is corroborated by other studies. Thus, in a study prepared for 
the ILO, Sundar (2011) shows that non-regular workers receive lower wages, are more vulnerable 
to accidents and health hazards, and have low representation in unions and associations. Further, 
these results are reinforced if account is taken of other workers in NSFE, such as homeworkers.  
8. Recent changes in policy and law with implications 
for NSFE 
As pointed out in earlier sections, there are two strands of the discussion on Non-
Standard Forms of Employment, both of which acknowledge the stark duality in Indian labour 
markets. In one stand, reflected in the stand of business associations, some government policy 
committees such as the Planning Commission Task Force on Employment (Planning 
Commission, 2001), and academic writings, the focus is on labour markets more flexible, by 
relaxing the CLRA and the Factories Act, and by removing chapter 5(B) of the Industrial 
Disputes Act. This debate does not elaborate on the type of labour market that should emerge in 
India, in terms of the degree of flexibility, industrial relations regime etc. 
The other strand, acknowledges the rigidity in labour markets but emphasizes the need to 
have comprehensive changes in labour laws, including the simplification of laws and their 
consolidation (SNCL, 2002), and more effective regulation of working conditions with respect to 
informal employment, preferably by having a comprehensive law that addresses minimum 
conditions of work and social security (SNCL; NCEUS; Papola et. al.). It also argues that the 
abrogation of Chapter 5B of the IDA should be accompanied by higher levels of compensation to 
workers under Chapter 5A of the IDA, as well as provision of unemployment insurance and 
retraining (NCEUS, 2009b). 
The extensive review of labour legislation in a few study states in Papola et al. (2008), 
Dougherty (2008) shows that states have made changes in labour laws as well as their 
implementation in order to provide greater flexibility to employers. Our own study of the 
organised garment sector in the Delhi National Capital Region shows that changes in some of the 
laws, such as the CLRA, have been more extensive than what is ordinarily described in the 
literature, and that this is also borne out by the enormous increase in the proportion of the contract 
workforce. 
The current Union government and several of the state governments have adopted labour 
reforms as a key policy agenda, ostensibly with the objective of bolstering manufacturing in 
India. In recent months, some state governments, notably Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have 
taken further steps to liberalise three key laws viz. the Industrial Disputes Act, the Factories Act 
and the Contract Labour Act. These amendments affect not only flexibility of firms in these states 
to dismiss workers, but also affect regulation of working conditions (under the Factories Act), the 
raising of disputes, and the formation of trade unions. Further, amendments have also been made 
to laws/rules concerning the inspection of factories. 
The Rajasthan government’s amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA), 
Factories Act, 1948 (FA) and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA), 
contain the following provisions: 
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• The IDA amendment has allowed industrial establishments employing up to 300 workmen to 
retrench (terminate) workmen without seeking prior permission of the government. 
Currently, an industrial establishment employing at least 100 workmen is required to seek 
prior permission. 
• The threshold of number of workmen engaged as contract labour by an employer for the 
purpose of applicability of the CLRA has been raised from 20 to 50.  
• The threshold of number of employees for the purpose of applicability of the Factories Act 
has been increased from 10 to 20 in factories using power,  and from 20 to 40 in the case of 
factories not using power),  
• d. The minimum membership requirement in a factory or establishment for a union to be 
recognized has been raised from 15% to at least 30% of the total workforce. 
• A three-year statute of limitations has been imposed for raising industrial disputes under the 
IDA. 
The Madhya Pradesh government has also approved amendments to as many as 20 labour 
laws. Of these, 17 are central government laws, including the IDA and the Factories Act, and 
three state laws.  Under the Amendments to the IDA, lay-offs, retrenchments and even closures 
will not require any permission in units employing up to 300 workers. The Amendment to the 
Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 would permit employers of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) having less than 50 workers to terminate any employee 
without giving any reason or conducting any enquiry. The amendments to the Factories Act have 
extended maximum working hours per week from 60 hours to 72 hours and permissible overtime 
from 75 hours to 125 hours. Exemptions have been given to micro industries from certain labour 
laws mainly the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the Factories Act, 1948, 
MP Industrial Employment Act, 1961 and the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The labour commissioner 
in lieu of labour inspector will now have the power to prosecute employers in case of any 
violation of labour laws. State industries will be exempt from maintaining 68 registrations and 
furnishing 16 returns under 19 different laws and will need to maintain only one register. These 




The Central government has also introduced amendments to the Factories Act, 1948; 
Apprentices Act, 1961; and the Labour Laws (exemption from furnishing returns and maintaining 
registers by certain establishments) Act, 1988. The Factories Amendment Bill, 2014, allows State 
governments to raise the threshold of coverage from 10 workers to 20 workers in factories 
operating with power and from 20 to 40 in factories not using power. As a result, the bulk of 
factories and workers stand to be exempted from the purview of the Act, which essentially is a 
piece of legislation that regulates working conditions. A draft proposal for small-scale industries 
has been put up on the Labour Ministry’s website, exempting units employing up to 40 workers 
from at least 14 basic laws, which include exemption from the Factories Act, the Industrial 
Disputes Act, the ESI Act and the Maternity Benefits Act. 
It has now proposed the consolidation of 44 labour laws into four labour codes on wages 
and remuneration, industrial relations, industrial safety and welfare, and social security. The 
proposed Wages Code Bill amalgamates provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948, The 
Payment of Wages Act 1936, The Payment of Bonus Act 1965, and The Equal Remuneration Act 
1976 and the government has held consultations on the draft. The proposed Code on Industrial 
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Relations Bill, 2015, combines Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and 
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. A draft of the Code on Industrial 
Relations Bill has been put on the Ministry of Labour’s website 
(http://labour.nic.in/content/whatsnews/comments-on-draft-labour-code-on-industrial-
relations.php). The Ministry has sought comments on the Bill till May 26, 2015, and is holding 
tripartite consultations on it. The Bill proposes that factories employing up to 300 workers would 
not require prior government sanction to retrench workers. However, it also raises the severance 
pay from 15 days per year of employment to 45 days. It also raises requirements for formation of 
trade unions and the required notice period for strikes, and also broadens the definition of strike to 
includes actions such as mass casual leave. Drafts of the other proposed bills are still to be 
unveiled. The amalgamation of different labour laws into comprehensive codes and their 
simplifications has earlier been suggested by the National Commission of Labour (2002) and also 
by the NCEUS (2009). But trade unions are opposed to these changes on the grounds that the 
current exercise has not been participatory, and that it is broadly been driven by the objective of 
reducing regulation of working conditions and making unionization of workers and industrial 
action more difficult. 
While some of these amendments (which follow state level de jure and de facto changes) 
reduce the transaction cost of firms in maintaining registers mandated by law, and reduce 
inspections, they may run counter to ILO Convention C. 47 ratified by India, and may have 
negative consequences not only for regulating conditions of work, but also for safety, and 
accidents (Sundar, 2014).12 Most of the changes introduce greater labour market flexibility and 
restrict workers’ rights to form trade unions and engage in strike action. 
There is no immediate move to introduce more comprehensive and effective regulation 
regarding conditions of work. It remains to be seen whether the changes that are being introduced 
will expand employment adhering to core labour standards and decent work. 
9. Conclusion 
Trends in NSFE in developing economies such as India have to be seen in the context of 
a rapidly changing economic and occupational structure, leading to a shift away from agriculture, 
the growth of an organised segment in manufacturing and services, and the requirement of paid 
work with certain characteristics within it. These characteristics of employed workers are also 
currently being influenced by the pattern of global production and competition, which is 
encouraging outsourcing and vertical and horizontal production networks. This national and 
global dynamics interacts with historically situated Indian polices, and labour and other 
institutions, which are now rapidly changing to allow for faster responses to market conditions 
through greater flexibility in labour markets. 
The general outcome of all this is a trend towards greater homework (with distinct 
gendered features); informalization of employment (even among regular wage/salaried workers), 
                                                   
12 Sundar (2014) points out that there has been a substantial reduction in inspections over the years, with the 
proportion of registered factories that have been inspected, declining steeply from 63.05per cent in 1986 to 17.88per 
cent in 2008. Inadequate number of inspectors, and infrastructure and changes in policy with respected to specific 
locations, industries and states has contributed to this. At the same time, there has been a rise in industrial accidents, 
with a doubling of the percentage of accidents to workdays between 1980 and 2008. 
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and recruitment of workers through contracting and sub-contracting chains. These workers 
experience deficits in labour standards, including core labour standards, particularly in the 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; and also in the elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace.   
In the specific case of contract labourers in the organised sector, since laws are being 
liberalised, and their implementation is weak, and in any case, the law does not provide for 
similar wages and working conditions to contract workers, the outcome for these workers falls 
short on every ground. More significantly, these workers do not have recourse to the formal 
industrial relations machinery and employers make every effort to deny them any collective, or 
any individual recourse, to seek redress of grievances, this situation has led to explosive industrial 
conflicts in recent years. Further, as studies show, the impact of the hiring of a segment of flexible 
contract workers also spills on to the regular segment of the workforce, in general, reducing their 
ability to organise and bargain. This has generally affected workers' freedom of association and 
right to collective bargaining, and for contract workers, led to persistent discrimination at the 
workplace.     
There are very few studies which examine the impact of NSFE - mainly contract workers 
- on employers and firm productivity but some attest to a negative impact (generally considered 
against the positive impact on firms' gaining numerical flexibility). But the high turnover of 
workers, impact on skill creation, and other factors such as loyalty to the firm, acquiring 
production ethics etc., are less studied, but possibly important consequences of the increased 
hiring of such workers. 
As we have seen in section 8, there have been major recommendations in the past calling 
for simplification of labour laws, comprehensive and effective regulation of conditions of work, 
minimum conditions of work in the informal sector, and the introduction of higher levels of social 
security and termination benefits, along with greater flexibility in hiring and firing to employers 
(NCEUS, 2009b; NCL 2002). But the reforms that are currently being considered by states and 
the federal government principally aim at greater labour flexibility and very little attention has 
been paid either to introducing minimum conditions of work, or to effective regulation of 
prescribed conditions laid down by existing law. Furthermore, the proposed reforms are not based 
on wide ranging and in-depth tri-partite consultations through well-established mechanisms such 
as the Indian Labour Conference which are required given the wide ranging nature of the changes 
that is being contemplated. They also do not seem to appreciate the current context in which the 
right of workers to form associations and collective bargaining is already severely curtailed. 
While on the one hand, these changes could aggravate the existing imbalance in industrial 
relations, on the other, the increased informality and high turnover of workers could overturn the 
advantage that is hoped to be gained from higher labour flexibility. 
Labour policy in India should aim to reduce the chasm between under-regulated and 
over-regulated sectors, by making minimum conditions of work applicable to all workers, 
simplifying and modifying labour laws which are applicable to the formal sector, with the 
objective of introducing an optimum degree of flexi-security, making regulation of conditions of 
work more effective, and making the machinery for implementation of industrial relations and 
labour laws efficient, speedy, and more accessible to workers. Tripartism should continue to be 
the bedrock of labour policy and labour law reform. The Contract Labour (Regulation and 
abolition) Act 1970, which obfuscates the relationship between the worker and 
firm/establishment, should be comprehensively reviewed and its scope restricted. The employer-
employee relationship should be clearly defined, covered by a formal contract, and wherever 
possible, linked to a universal social security card, which would combine the smart card now 
 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 68 53 
available to workers under the formal sector socials security schemes and the one proposed by the 
NCEUS for unorganised sector workers. These proposals are not entirely new and have been 
extensively deliberated upon in the Commissions cited earlier (SNCL, 2002; NCEUS, 2007, 
2009a, 2009b). These changes could balance the interests of employers and employees to a 
greater degree, introduce a higher formalisation of production and of employment relations, and 
incentivise production, skill development and productivity improvement. 
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Table A. Contract intensity and percentage of contract workers by 3 digit NIC Group, 1999-2000 & 2010-2011 

















351 Building and repair of ships & boats 24.0 0.4 69.7 0.5 45.7 
160 Manufacture of tobacco products  12.8 5.7 65.5 7.9 52.7 
142 Mining and quarrying, n.e.c. 4.8 0.0 65.2 0.2 60.4 
342 
Manufacture of bodies (coach work) for motor vehicles; manufacture of  
trailers and semi-trailers 
15.1 0.3 64.6 1.1 49.5 
269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 35.5 11.0 58.2 11.6 22.6 
281 
Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam 
generators 
28.7 2.3 52.7 3.6 24.0 
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 26.6 0.7 52.0 0.7 25.5 
300 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 26.2 0.2 51.4 0.2 25.2 
155 Manufacture of beverages 25.4 1.4 50.1 1.7 24.7 
322 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and line telegraphy 
1.9 0.1 49.3 0.4 47.4 
315 Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment 14.5 0.3 48.5 0.6 34.0 
151 
Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit  vegetables, oils 
and fats 
35.4 4.9 47.6 2.6 12.2 
352 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 10.0 0.2 47.5 0.4 37.5 
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products 27.0 1.2 47.2 0.8 20.1 
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 22.6 3.4 46.4 2.8 23.8 
343 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines  11.0 1.4 46.3 5.9 35.3 
271 Manufacture of Basic Iron & Steel 22.6 7.5 45.9 6.9 23.4 
359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 28.1 5.2 45.4 2.2 17.3 
140 Agricultural and animal husbandry service activities 18.0 1.8 42.3 1.1 24.4 
323 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or 
reproducing apparatus, and associated goods  
6.8 0.2 41.5 0.2 34.7 
 
 
273 Casting of metals   23.5 2.0 41.5 2.3 17.9 
153 
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products, and prepared 
animal feeds 
38.0 9.4 41.5 3.6 3.5 
313 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus  10.8 0.4 40.4 0.8 29.7 
272 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 20.3 1.2 40.2 1.1 20.0 
289 
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products; metal working service 
activities 
9.5 1.1 37.7 3.2 28.2 
361 Manufacture of furniture 22.6 0.4 37.5 0.4 14.9 
242 Manufacture of other chemical products 15.8 5.6 37.4 6.3 21.7 
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 9.2 0.5 36.6 1.5 27.4 
152 Manufacture of dairy product  18.7 0.8 35.8 1.1 17.1 
319 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 12.8 0.2 34.8 0.4 22.0 
292 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 8.7 1.2 34.7 2.3 25.9 
191 
Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage handbags, saddlery 
& harness 
7.2 0.3 34.3 0.8 27.1 
291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 7.8 1.6 34.1 2.4 26.2 
314 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 22.8 0.3 32.2 0.3 9.4 
293 Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c. 12.2 0.3 31.0 0.3 18.7 
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 0.0 0.0 30.9 0.0 30.9 
251 Manufacture of rubber products 10.0 0.9 30.5 1.3 20.5 
252 Manufacture of plastic products 11.7 1.3 30.4 2.4 18.7 
210 Manufacture of paper and paper product 18.7 2.5 27.5 1.6 8.9 
221 Publishing  5.7 0.2 27.4 0.1 21.7 
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 11.8 0.6 27.4 0.9 15.6 
231 Manufacture of coke oven products  10.7 0.2 26.9 0.2 16.3 
202 Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 7.3 0.2 26.4 0.4 19.1 
321 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 2.8 0.1 22.6 0.4 19.8 
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 1.8 0.1 22.2 0.7 20.4 
172 Manufacture of other textiles 16.7 0.9 21.6 1.4 4.9 
369 Manufacturing n.e.c. 15.3 1.1 20.5 1.0 5.2 
331 
Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments and appliances for  
measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes except optical 
instruments 
5.4 0.1 19.8 0.3 14.4 
 
 
243 Manufacture of man-made fibres  15.2 0.4 18.9 0.1 3.6 
371 Recycling of metal waste and scrap  73.6 0.0 18.8 0.0 -54.8 
154 Manufacture of other food products 8.5 4.8 17.3 3.3 8.8 
332 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 0.7 0.0 16.9 0.0 16.2 
181 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel  4.6 1.1 15.2 2.6 10.6 
171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles. 10.0 10.4 13.4 3.8 3.4 
201 Saw milling and planning of wood 1.4 0.0 12.6 0.0 11.2 
192 Manufacture of footwear 13.4 0.9 12.1 0.6 -1.3 
173 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 6.8 0.3 9.7 0.5 2.9 
182 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 7.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -6.8 
223 Reproduction of recorded media  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All   15.8 100.0 34.7 100.0 18.9 
Source: Computed from ASI unit records for 1998-99 and 2011-12. 
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